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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to §35-1-86 Utah Code 
Ann., et seq., (1953) as amended. 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order entered by the Honorable Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) for the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, pursuant to a 
hearing held before ALJ Allen on March 16,1989, and the subsequent order 
of the industrial commission, conducted on June 22,1989, denying review of 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the ALJ. In his 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, the administrative law 
judge concluded that although the appellant had suffered an injury as the result 
of a slip and fall on October 28, 1989, that he found no evidence that the 
appellant, based upon his own testimony, had suffered a head injury as the 
result of the fall. The appellant moved that the conclusions of the 
administrative law judge be reviewed by the industrial commission, which 
upheld the findings of the administrative law judge, although commenting 
that: 
Finally, the commission finds that the medical 
evidence in this case is conflicting with respect to 
whether the alleged head injury could possibly 
cause the applicant's current psychiatric and/or 
neurological problems. Based upon these 
considerations, the commission finds that the 
administrative law judge was correct in determining 
that no head injury occurred on October 26,1986. 
Order of the Commission denying motion for review, pp. 1-2. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the ALJ abuse his discretion in failing to impanel a 
Medical Advisory Board, or in failing to provide a Medical 
Consultant for the Court, in accordance with §35-1-77, Utah 
Code Ann.? 
2. Did the ALJ err in relying upon the testimony of a witness 
whose competence and credibility were at issue? 
3. Did the ALJ err is failing to provide an award for 
Temporary Partial Disability in keeping with the requirements of 
§35-1-65.1, Utah Code Ann.? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES 
AND RULES 
The conduct of and outcome of these proceedings are governed by §35-
1, Utah Code Ann., and the Rules of this Court, appropriate selections of 
which have been reproduced by photocopy for the Court's convenience, as 
contained in Appendix "A". In particular, the appellant refers this Court to 
§35-1-77, Utah Code Ann.. (1953) et seq., as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal reviewing the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order of Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge for the Industrial 
Commission of the State of Utah dated 27 March, 1989, denying the claim of 
the appellant for an award of compensation under the provisions of §35-1, 
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Utah Code Ann., and of the Order of the commission denying review of the 
same. 
For the purposes of this appeal, the appellant wishes to make clear the 
fact that he alleges no new set of facts being argued for the first time on 
appeal, and that the issues being argued by the appellant are legal in nature, 
centering upon an alleged abuse of discretion. Therefore, the appellant 
assumes, arguendo, that the facts operative in this appeal should be taken 
from three sources, the findings of fact of the ALJ and their review by the 
industrial commission, the transcript of the hearing, and the medical records 
involved, all of which taken together constitute the record in this case. The 
medical records should be considered as underlying the ALJ's decision in this 
matter, and are fundamental to the findings drawn which are based in no small 
part upon the testimony of the appellant. On numerous occasions, the ALJ 
disallowed the testimony of the appellant, stating in effect that the medical 
records spoke for themselves, or where already in the "file" and needed no 
substantiation or further explanation. (T. 24, 28, 39,46,66) 
In the findings of fact, the administrative law judge concluded that there 
had indeed been a slip and fall on October 26,1986, involving Mr. Wilstead, 
while he was acting within the scope of his employment with co-respondent 
West Way Motor Cargo. The administrative law judge further concluded that 
there was no injury to appellant's head during the course of the slip and fall. 
The administrative law judge found that the appellant had sustained a 
temporary aggravation of a preexisting injury to the lower back, but that he 
suffered no injury to the brain as a result of a head injury in that slip and fall. 
Importantly, the administrative Law Judge did not make any finding 
relative to the effect that a slip and fall serious enough to re-fracture a 
vertebrae might have on the human brain. The administrative law judge 
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simply found that there was no contact between the head of the appellant itself 
and the pavement, or fuel island curb. 
Finally, the appellant invites this court to review the voluminous 
medical file on record, and note that every single one of the 
neuropsychologists, and psychiatrists concluded that the appellant was 
severely depressed, constituting an undisputed fact, and that only one medical 
provider competent to render conclusions relative to the existence of Organic 
Brain Syndrome concluded that the appellant was not suffering from Organic 
Brain Syndrome. The greater weight of the evidence favors the existence of 
Organic Brain Syndrome, and there is no dispute that the appellant was and is 
severely depressed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The appellant questions the actions of the administrative law judge in 
entering an arbitrary and capricious finding that appellant suffered no damage 
to his brain as a result of his slip and fall, without the advice and counsel of a 
medical review board. The standard of review involving issues of law for 
administrative proceedings is quite different than the standard regarding 
findings of fact. The court applies on review the "correction-of-error" 
standard, giving "no difference to the expertise [or lack of it] of the 
commission". (Board of Education v. Olsen. 684 P.2d 49 (Utah 1984)) 
Regarding the role of this court upon review, the standard to be applied is 
quite liberal in contrast to that applied to findings of fact below. 
The administrative law judge proceeded in ruling upon the issue of 
organic brain damage without the benefit of the expertise of qualified 
physicians. As Dr. Kotrady states in his report (pages 212 - 213 of the 
medical records): 
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It is my opinion that this man is severely depressed. 
The depression appears to stem from the industrial 
accident in October, 1986. 
* * * 
I believe that he [the appellant] is suffering from 
organic brain syndrome secondary to the accident 
[at the truck stop]. It is my opinion that he is 
completely disabled as a result of this condition. 
The administrative law judge proceeded in formulating conclusions of law 
given this sort of declaration by the appellant's physicians without the benefit 
of a medical review panel. Furthermore, the level of disability from organic 
brain syndrome is difficult to determine, and the administrative law judge 
further erred in proceeding in light of the complexity and highly technical 
nature of the issues at hand: 
It is more difficult in cases of depression due to 
brain injury to determine the degree of disability 
than would be the case in the injury of a limb or 
some other body part... I would judge him to be 
totally disabled in his ability to perform his current 
line of work — driving a truck. I also feel that it 
would be highly unlikely, that in the near term he 
would be able to obtain and maintain other forms of 
employment 
Dr. Bushnell, at page 161 of the medical reports. 
In short, common sense alone or practical experience regarding general 
medical matters of daily life is wholly insufficient to supply one with the 
means of addressing the existence of such an injury. Furthermore, the 
administrative law judge was without competent medical advice as to the effect 
that organic brain disorder could have on the appellant's ability to testify or 
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present himself as a credible witness, or even of more fundamental issues, 
such as the competence of the appellant to testify. 
Organic Brian Syndrome, or Organic Mental Syndrome, presents itself 
in a variety of forms, each with its own symptomatology. Dementia, 
Alzheimer's Disease, Organic Personality Syndrome, Amnestic Syndrome, 
Organic Hallucinosis, Organic Affective Disorder and Organic Delusional 
Syndrome all fall under the general heading or Organic Brain Syndrome. (See 
appendix "B", attached) Each of these aspects of Organic Brain Syndrome 
presents itself with different symptoms, which will be discussed in greater 
detail in appellant's argument proper. Organic Brain Syndrome therefore 
presents a complex scenario of psychological symptoms, which are difficult to 
establish and prove, given the fact that in our world of scientific approaches to 
virtually all human inquiry, we depend almost exclusively upon physical 
evidence, when in fact some things, such as Organic Brain Syndrome have no 
physical manifestation that can be perceived clearly given our current 
standards of investigation. Nevertheless, although it is almost impossible to 
find physical evidence of Alzheimer's Disease in some patients, spending a 
few minutes with them readily convinces one that the do in fact have the 
disease, in spite of the lack of physical evidence. There, the AU needed 
experts to assist the Administrative court in assessing, first of all, the 
fundamental competence of the appellant as the only witness of the slip and 
fall, and need experts to advise it as to the ability of the appellant to offer 
credible, non-contradictory testimony over a given period of time. To 
conclude that someone diagnosed with Organic Brain Syndrome and severe 
depression is not a credible witness appears facile and misses fundamental 
issues relative to the truthfulness or reliability of the facts underlying the 
AU's decision denying an award to the appellant. 
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Utah Code Annotated §35-1-77, provides for the impaneling of a 
medical advisory board to assist the administrative judge in the resolution of 
matters which involve a medical expertise beyond that possessed by the judge. 
It is important to remember that hearings in these matters are fact finding 
forums primarily, and that the administrative law judge is to, in essence, 
conduct an inquiry into the facts surrounding the assertions of the claimant. 
The AU is armed with a battery of statutorily created mechanisms designed to 
supply discretionary fact-finding ability not found in courts of law. For that 
reason, greater weight is given to the findings made by the administrative law 
judge, and on appeal, one must demonstrate that the facts are wholly 
unsupported by the evidence presented at the hearing. (Kaiser Steel 
Corporation v. Monfredi. 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981)). However, when in 
the light of difficult issues (such as a claimant who has sustained previous 
industrial injuries and who now presents himself as a brain injured witness) 
the ALJ shirks the duty to make a sufficient inquiry and to take advantage of 
the expertise readily available through fact-finding mechanisms so as to draw 
reasonable factual findings and legal conclusions, this Court has the 
opportunity to rectify and remedy such an obvious abuse of statutory 
discretion in order to meet the ends of justice. 
Central and key to the finding of a compensable accident, or the lack 
thereof, is the establishment of both a legal cause of the injury as well as a 
medical cause. Certainly the appellant concedes that in cases where the 
claimant lost a finger or limb while operating industrial equipment at the 
claimant's place of employment while in the scope of employment, provides 
both legal and medical cause for establishing a compensable injury. The 
resolution of such claims is, compared to the issues in the present one, quite 
simple. However, the appellant made a claim, the complexity of which goes 
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far beyond the bounds of experience and knowledge of all but experts, in 
asserting an organic brain damage resultant from the slip and fall. The 
appellant assert therefore, that the administrative judge committed reversible 
error in failing to find both a legal and medical cause (or the lack thereof) 
regarding the appellant's claims, in violation of the standards established by 
the Supreme Court of Utah: 
[T]he key ingredient of an industrial accident is an 
unexpected occurrence. That occurrence may be 
"either the cause or the result of an injury. 
* * * 
The next step in determining whether an injury is a 
compensable accident requires analysis of whether 
the injury arose out of or in the course of 
employment. . . This factor requires proof of a 
causal connection between the injury and the 
working conditions ... [W]e first consider the legal 
cause of the injury and then its medical cause. 
* * * 
Under the statute as now written, "the commission 
may refer the medical aspects of the case to a 
medical panel appointed by the commission. . . 
Although referral to the medical panel is not 
required by statute, we believe in this case that the 
findings of that panel would aid the administrative 
law judge. . . (evidence of causal connection 
between work related event and the injury may be 
uncertain or highly technical whereby failure to refer 
the case may be an abuse of discretion). 
Hone v. J.F. Shea Company. 728 p.2d 1008 (Utah 1986), citations omitted, 
emphasis in original. 
8 
In finding no head injury resultant form the October 1986 slip and fall, 
the ALT dodged the issue of medical causation. The appellant did, according 
to the Findings of Fact, sustain a fall, the force of which was sufficient to re-
fracture the L-l vertebra. There was no medical evidence taken regarding 
whether or not such a fall could compress the spine in such a manner so as to 
damage the brain stem, or jar the head sufficiently so as to cause brain injury. 
In short, although the "records" of the physicians "speak for themselves", 
they are silent as to whether or not there is, for the purposes of Worker's 
Compensation, a medical cause for the appellant's claim of brain damage. 
The records simply do not address the issues of medical causation, which was 
improperly decided by the ALT, in accordance with his own common capacity 
and knowledge of neuropsychology. Furthermore, there records were silent 
as to the interplay of the injury, which was no doubt quite painful, the 
previous mental or emotional state of the appellant, the severe depression 
present following the accident, and the substantial issue of brain damage. The 
medical record is silent concerning the credibility of the appellant's 
"flashback", which in light of common sense may seem absurd or 
incredulous, but in light of brain damage or organic brain syndrome coupled 
with depression, is in fact quite reasonable. Therefore, although the medical 
records did speak for themselves on certain issues, there were dead silent on 
others which were of key importance in resolving the appellant's claim below. 
The reliance of the AU on such information and his failure to impanel a 
medical review board and engage experts to assist in the fact finding mission 
of the ALJ and the Industrial Commission is grave error, warranting a re-
hearing under the written guidance of this Court, sufficient to preserve 
traditional notions of justice and equity, for which the Worker's 
Compensation laws were designed and implemented. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURTS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARE FACT-FINDINfi BODIES 
WHOSE PRIMARY MISSION IS TO UNCOVER THF TRUTH OF A CIATM 
THROUGH A WTOF ARRAY OF STATUTORY MECHANISMS 
The mission of the Industrial Commission ("commission"), regarding 
claims made by worker's for injury awards, is primarily that of facts finding, 
in this regard, they differ significantly from judicial courts. The 
administrative courts of the commission are more correctly compared with 
those of continental Europe, than those of the Anglo-American system. 
Essentially, they are inquisitorial in nature, with a judge resembling at times a 
prosecutor, rather than an impartial arbitrator and judge of law alone. Unlike 
the judicial courts of this State, Administrative Law Judges (ALJ's) of the 
commission can actively participate, without motion of counsel, to move a 
case along a particular line of fact-finding. In this sense, they "prosecute" the 
case on at least a co-equal basis with counsel. In order to provide for such 
"prosecution", the laws of this State have vested ALJ's with broad 
discretionary powers not granted to judges in courts of justice. The equitable 
purposes of the granting of such discretion are important. The State thus 
allows for the speedy conclusion of Worker's Compensation claims. At 
times, however, if such discretion is abused, the legal conclusions drawn 
from such inquiries is not afforded a significant degree of deference on 
appeal, whereas the findings of underlying fact are. 
Examples of the broad discretion discussed are found in Appendix "A". 
In §35-1-77, Utah Code Ann., there is a provision for the impaneling of a 
medical review board, or the hiring of medical consultants to assist the ALJ in 
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drawing appropriate conclusions for the raw or naked fact gathered into the 
record. At one time, the impaneling of the board was mandatory, but issues 
of cost savings prompted the legislature to amend the statute, making it 
discretionary. §35-1-85.1, Utah Code Ann. Allows the ALJ, on a co-equal 
basis with counsel to notice and take depositions of any person, in order to 
facilitate fact-finding. $35-1-91. Utah Code Ann, provides that the ALT can 
order an autopsy at its own discretion, without motion from counsel, and 
without hearing counsel's arguments on the matter. §35-1-94, Utah Code 
Ann., allows the ALT to order the inspection, or to personally inspect, the 
records of employers involved in the claim dispute. §35-1-98, Utah Code 
Ann, gives the AU discretion to order reports from medical providers, 
irrespective of those submitted by counsel, or in addition to them. In short, 
the ALJ has all the powers necessary to conduct discovery as if she or he were 
counsel. In fact, the ALJ is in reality "super" counsel, since such discovery 
can be made "ex parte", and without argument, objections or hearings. 
In emphasizing the fact-finding role of the commission, the Supreme 
Court of Utah has stated that the courts of the commission are administrative 
and ministerial in nature, and are only "clothed" with judicial powers (Palle v. 
Ind. Comm'n.. 81 Utah 372, 18 P.2d 299 (1933)), and that the commission 
is an administrative body, an "arm of the state", not the product of the judicial 
branch of government. (Woldberg v. Ind. Comm'n.. 74 Utah 309, 279 P.2d 
609 (1929)) The fact that such discretionary fact-finding mechanisms is 
provided by statute is evidence alone that they should be employed whenever 
situations call for expertise or special knowledge. The failure to do so is the 
sum and substance of "abuse of discretion". 
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POINT II 
THE PURPOSES OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION LAWS HAVE BEEN 
FRUSTRATED BY THE ACTIONS OF THE A L T 
The purpose of fact-finding by the ALT is to place responsibility for 
industrially related accidents upon industry and no upon the State or the 
individual citizens of the Utah. The Worker's Compensation laws are the 
product of the industrial revolution, which, as an ever-increasing urbanization 
unfolded, involved a larger and larger working class, with an increased risk of 
injury due to more complex methods of production. A policy decision was in 
effect made when the legislature decided to lay the costs of industry on the 
shoulders of industry through such laws for appropriate compensation. As 
stated by the Supreme Court of Utah: 
The purposes which underlie the Workmen's 
Compensation Act are: to assure o the insured 
employee and his dependants an income during the 
period of his total disability and to provide 
compensation for any resulting permanent disability; 
to accomplish this by a simple and speedy 
procedure which eliminates the expense delay, and 
uncertainty in having to prove negligence on the part 
of the employer; and to thus require industry to bear 
the burden of the injuries suffered in it. 
Wilstead v. Ind. Comm'n.. 407 P.2d 692 (Utah 1965) 
The Supreme Court of Utah has stated that: 
We have also repeatedly held that this statute {for 
Worker's Compensation] would be liberally 
construed, and if there is any doubt respecting the 
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right to compensation, it should be resolved in favor 
of a recovery." 
Chandler v. Ind. Comm'n.. 55 Utah 213, 184 P.2d 1020 (1919) at 1021. 
The legislature of this State made the conscious decision to create a 
commission designed to place the burden of industrial accidents upon the 
shoulders of industry. In order to accomplish this, the commission has been 
vested, as an arm of the state itself, with broad discretion in its fact-finding 
mission. 
It appears that the ALT in the present case is unapprised of the mission 
and goals of the Worker's Compensation laws of this State. I found that there 
indeed had been an industrially related accident, involving the re-injury of the 
claimant's lower back, yet failed to provide compensation, and instead it has 
forced the claimant, and the citizens of this State, to bear the expense of this 
accident. Furthermore, the ALT failed in inquire into the causal links between 
the obviously powerful fall to the ground, and the alleged brain injury, 
independent of any injury to the head. In so doing, the costs of the claimant's 
inability to function as an employable member of the society of this State is 
born by the claimant and the citizens of Utah. Such is in direct conflict with 
the purpose of the Worker's Compensation laws. 
POINT III 
THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR A TEMPORARY 
PARTIAL DISABILITY SUFFEREP AS THE RESULT OF THE SLIP ANP FALL IN 
OCTOBER OF 1986 
In his Conclusions of Law, the AU states that he determined that Mr. 
Wilstead sustained a "temporary aggravation to his low back on October 26th, 
1986, while employed by Westway Motor Freight, with no permanent 
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impairment resulting therefrom." (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order, p. 8) §35-1-65.1, Utah Code Ann, provides for an award based upon 
temporary partial disability resulting from an industrially related accident. The 
ALT found that such temporary partial disability had in fact occurred, yet 
failed to make an award based upon that finding. Such is obvious error, and 
should result in reversal in order to determine the appropriate amount of the 
award Mr. Wilstead should receive, or in the alternative, it is appropriate for 
this Court to make such an award upon review. 
POINT IV 
THE ALT ABUSED THE STATUTORY DISCRETION VESTED IN THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION TN FATLINC. TO IMPANEL A MEDICAL ADVISORY 
BOARD OR HIRE A MFPTCAL CONSULTANT TO ASSIST TN RESOLVING TSSTIF.S 
RELATING TO THE COMPETENCY OF MR. WILSTEAD. THE CREDIBILITY OF 
HTS TESTIMONY AND THE ISSUE OF MEDICAL CAUSATION OF HIS 
DEPRESSION AND BRAIN DAMAGE, 
The fact that medical providers agreed unanimously that Mr. Wilstead 
was severely depressed, and that others claimed he was brain damaged, raised 
serious issues regarding the competency of Mr. Wilstead, his ability to offer 
credible testimony and the medical causation of the brain damage and 
depression. This abuse of discretion was not brought to the attention of the 
ALT or the commission, but is raised on Mr. Wilstead's petition for review by 
this Court. 
However, in order to understand the implications of raising a matter for 
the first time on appeal, we should divide factual issues from questions of 
law, or from the advancement of a particular legal theory at the hearing. 
Unfortunately, there is little Utah law on the subject of Worker's 
Compensation compared to that generated by many other states. Therefore, 
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the appellant cites the following California cases for the benefit of this Court 
regarding the split between new facts and new theories of law or questions of 
law on appeal: Muffett v. Rovster. 195 Cal.Rptr. 73 (1983); Wilson v. 
Lewis. 165 Cal.Rptr. 396 (1980). 
The Supreme Court of Utah did address this very issue in the case of 
Stanley v. Ind. Comm'n.. 8 P.2d 770 (Utah 1932). The court therein stated 
at page 771: 
The rule that pertains to the courts to the effect that 
parties cannot try a case on one theory and then 
attempt to gain reversal upon some other theory on 
appeal not advanced on the trial should probably not 
be applied as strictly to the commission ... The 
reasons that lie at the base of that rule as applied to 
the courts are not as potent as applied to the 
commission. It is its duty to determine whether the 
conditions precedent exist which entitle an applicant 
to payment. Consequently it has the duty to 
determine, regardless of the theories advanced by 
counsel, whether the condition precedent exists. 
The Supreme Court demonstrated its understanding of the purpose of the 
commission and that its primary function is to determine the appropriateness 
of an award to the claimant. The hearing before the ALT was not a true 
adversarial hearing, and the discretionary powers of the commission, 
discussed previously, combine to make the strict rule forbidding the 
advancement of one theory at trial and another on appeal untenable, and 
subject the applicability of that rule to a case by case testing. It is the raising 
of new facts for the first time on appeal, which call for the entry of factual 
findings by the appellate court, which is clearly improper. The appellant has 
taken steps to assure this Court that it calls for no new or additional factual 
determination in these proceedings. Instead, Mr. Wilstead contends that the 
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commission had all of the information necessary to raise the issues of 
competency, capacity to testify and medical causation of the claimed brain 
damage before it. The ALJ had the duty to ascertain medical causation, had 
the duty to employ statutory discovery tools and mechanisms for resolving 
these issues, and failed to do so. These issues were clearly before the ALT. It 
is inconceivable that one could elicit testimony form an individual whom 
medical providers had concluded was brain damaged, without some question 
as to competency and capacity surfacing. Furthermore, it is inconceivable that 
the ALJ was unaware of the issue of medical causation in this case, however, 
rather than seeking competent and qualified advice and guidance on these 
subjects, the ALJ proceeded as a lay person. 
Under ordinary circumstances, this may not be an abuse of discretion. 
The nature of ulcers, for example, is a subject that can be understood by most 
persons with a simple explanation with visual aids. We are not dealing with 
so simple a subject in this appeal. While the appellant does not call for any 
factual finding by this Court, Mr. Wilstead points out through counsel the 
highly technical nature of his claim for brain damage. 
As stated by Dr. Richard L. Elliot in his article "An Introduction to 
Organic Brain Syndromes", Vol. 5, no. 3, Behavioral Sciences and the Law. 
Su. 1987, at page 287: 
Organic brain syndromes are of forensic interest for 
several reasons. First, patients with organic brain 
syndromes may require judicial determination of 
competence in any number of areas ... Second, any 
patient whose mental state is of legal interest will 
need evaluation for contributing organic factors; 
uncovering these factors may have considerable 
medical and legal consequence. Third, the 
discovery of organic factors may be decisive in the 
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outcome of a judicial proceeding, where "hard" 
biological data are often accorded more weight, and 
are thus more persuasive than "soft" psychological 
data. 
A copy of the article is attached as Appendix "B" for the Court's convenience. 
Because counsel for the appellant does not wish to be perceived as attempting 
to argue new facts on appeal, a discussion of the numerous types of Organic 
Brain Syndromes will not be undertaken in great detail. However, one final 
quote from Dr. Elliot's article will be sufficient to illustrate the ALJ's 
undertaking in ruling on medical causation of the appellant's brain damage: 
There are many possible etiologies for each organic 
brain syndrome. Virtually any medication or 
physical illness can conceivably lead to an organic 
brain syndrome. A listing of all the possibilities 
would be so large as virtually to constitute a table of 
contents in a textbook of medicine. 
Elliot at 288. 
Failure to impanel a medical board can be grounds for reversal by this 
Court. Certainly it is grounds for such a reversal according to facts of this 
case. The test of whether or not the failure to impanel of a medical board is 
error was set out in Hone , supra. At page 1011, the Supreme Court states: 
Although referral to the medical panel is not 
required by statute, we believe in this case that the 
findings of that panel would aid the administrative 
law judge. See Champion Home Builders v. 
Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 
1985) (evidence of causal connection between 
work-related event and the injury may be uncertain 
of highly technical whereby failure to refer the case 
may be an abuse of discretion). 
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[Note that Hone also addresses the fact that a 
claimant is not barred simply by the existence of a 
pre-existing condition, but that the level of proof 
required is higher] 
Since the very competency and credibility of the only witness to the 
industrial accident in question was at issue, and medical causation was also at 
issue, the necessary evidence upon which the ALJ could make any findings 
whatsoever was uncertain. The issues involved are highly technical as well. 
The facts of this case bring it within the holding in Hone. 
The AU, clearly abused his discretion in failing to seek competent and 
qualified advice on the subject of organic brain disorders. The expansive 
nature of the subject, together with its highly technical testing procedures 
requires special counsel and advice to the commission. A copy of some of the 
organic brain syndrome tests undertaken by the medical providers of the Mr. 
Wilstead has been attached as Appendix "C". I would invite this Court to 
examine these test results. They, indeed, speak for themselves, but not in 
favor of the ALJ's ruling. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The ALJ erred in filing to at least compensate Mr. Wilstead for a partial 
temporary disability, and in failing to seek competent and qualified medical 
counsel by impaneling a medical board. Such requires the vacation of the 
Order of the commission, and the entry of new findings, pursuant to the 
written guidance of this Court. 
Dated this n day of November, 1989. 
DAVID D. PEC& 
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APPENDIX "A" 
35-1-10. Rules for procedure. 
Subject to the provisions of this title, the commission shall adopt and pub-
lish rules and regulations governing procedure before it, and shall prescribe 
forms of notices and the manner of serving the same in all claims for compen-
sation, and may change the same from time to tame in its discretion. Such 
rules and regulations shall include provisions for procedures m the nature of 
conferences in order to dispose of cases informally, or to expedite claims adju-
dication, narrow issues and simplify the methods of proof at hearings. 
Hiatory: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 9? OL. 1917, 1919, ch. 63, 5 1; ILS. 1933 & C. 1943, 
3069; CX. 1917, § 3130x, added by L. 42-M0? L, 1965, ch. 67, 5 L 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Effect of rules. 
Effect of violation of rules. 
Filing fflairn 
Forfeiture of compensation. 
Judicial notice. 
Power of commission to promulgate rules. 
Presumption on appeal 
Rules of evidence. 
Rules o£ procedure. 
Settlement of claims. 
Written application. 
Effect of rules. 
Injured emplovee who makes application for 
compensation to commission is bound to take 
notice o( its rules and regulations affecting 
that application. Varounas v Industrial 
Comm'n. 56 Utah 574, 191 P. 1091 (1920) 
Effect of violation of rules. 
Where employee violates rule of Industrial 
Commission or disobeys orders of attending 
pnysician, or otherwise arbitanly refuses to co-
operate with those in attendance upon him. the 
award or compensation snould cover only such 
period of incapacity or disability as would usu-
ally and ordinarily result from character of in-
jury received by employee. Varoukas v. Indus-
trial Comm n. 56 Utah 574,191 P 1091 (1920). 
Where injured employee leaves locality of 
his employment in violation of rule of Indus-
trial Commission, burden is on such emplovee 
to show why his absence has not prejudiced his 
employer, or insurance carrier, or state insur-
ance fund, and did not prolong period of his 
disability. Varoukas v. Industrial Comm'n, 56 
Utah 574, 191 P. 1091 (1920). 
Filing **if»i*w 
Within the time allowed for filing the origi-
nal claim, an unauthorized filing thereof may 
be ratified by the person in whose behalf it has 
been performed, and such ratification in a 
Presumption on appeal, 
Where claimant did not assail or question 
reasonableness or lawfulness of rules of Indus-
trial Commission with reference to compensa-
tion claims for hernia. Supreme Court assumed 
that such rules are reasonable and lawful. 
Staker v. Industrial Comm'n, 61 Utah 11, 209 
P. 880 (1922). 
Rules of evidence. 
Industrial Commission is not authorized un-
der this section and § 35-1-68 to promulgate 
rules prescribing what evidence shall be neces-
sary to warrant recovery in particular cases; 
authority to prescribe particular evidence nec-
essary to establish fact is peculiarly within 
province of legislature, and involving substan-
tive law, cannot be assumed by commission in 
absence of express statutory provision delegat-
ing such authority. Livingston v. Industrial 
Comm'n. 68 Utah 567, 251 P. 368 (1926). 
Rules of procedure. 
The rules promulgated by the commission 
must be reasonable and must conform to the 
spirit of the Compensation Act (§ 35-1-1 et 
seq.). Varoukas v. Industrial Comm n, 56 Utah 
574, 191 P. 1091 (1920). 
Rules of procedure promulgated by commis-
sion cannot deprive parties of constitutional 
rights to day in court and of having cause de-
termined after impartial hearing. Ocean Acci-
dent & Guarantee Corp. v Industrial Comm n. 
66 Utah 600, 245 P. 343 (1926). 
This section gives the industrial Commission 
power to adopt rules of procedure not mconsis-
proper case validates the unauthorized act, and 
is equivalent to original authority for doing it; 
but after expiration of tune for filing original 
claim, ratification comes too late. Taslich v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 71 Utah 33, 262 P. 281 
(1928) 
Forfeiture of compensation. 
Rule which gave Industrial Commission 
power to forfeit all compensation wruch ac-
crued to injured emplovee who had left locality 
of his employment without any hearing is un-
reasonable and contrary to spirit of Compensa-
tion Act (§ 35-1-1 et seq.). Varoukas v Indus-
trial Comm'n, 56 Utah 574,191 P. 1091 (1920). 
Judicial notice. 
Supreme Court will not take judicial notice 
as to what rules of procedure may have been 
adooted or prescribed by the industrial com-
mission. Carter v. Industrial Comm a, 76 Utah 
520, 290 P. 776 (1930). 
Power of commission to promulgate rules. 
Industrial Commission has ample power to 
promulgate all reasonable rules and regula-
tions for protection of those who are injured. 
and also to protect rights of employer, and that 
of insurance carrier, and may saieguard state 
insurance fund. Varoukas v Industrial 
Comm'n, 56 Utah 574. 191 P. 1091 (1920). 
tent with the act (§ 35-1-1 et seq.). Carter v. 
Industrial Comma, 76 Utah 520, 290 P. 776 
(1930). 
Settlement of claims. 
The commission has the prerogative to adopt 
regulations governing the settlement of claims. 
Wilburn v. Interstate Elec, 748 P. 2d 582 (CL 
App. 1988). 
Written application. 
The commission should insist that every ap-
plicant comply with its rules by which he is 
required to file a written application. Such an 
application should be filed in every case and at 
least the jurisdictional facts should be stated. 
Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comma, 59 Utah 
46, 201 P. 1034 (1921) 
The application or claim for compensation 
must be made by the party entitled to compen-
sation, or by or through some other person 
legally authorized to act for him. A claim made 
in behalf of a dependent by a mere volunteer 
binds neither dependent nor employer, and is a 
nullity. Taslich v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Utah 
33. 262 P. 281 (1927). 
A claim for compensation under the Indus-
trial Act (5 35-1-1 et seq.) is only one claim, no 
matter how many hearings are had or how 
many distinct awards are made. It is a claim oy 
the employee for compensation for the injury 
he has sustained, notwithstanding the compen-
sation may be determined from time to time 
resulting in many distinct awards. Aetna Life 
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comma, 73 Utah 366, 
274 P. 139 (1929). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
35-1-19* Investigation of places of employment — Viola-
tions of rules or orders — Temporary injunction. 
(1) Upon complaint by any person that any employment or place of employ-
ment, regardless of the number of persons employed, is not safe or is injurious 
to the welfare of any employee, the commission shall proceed, with or without 
notice, to make such investigation as may be necessary to determine the 
matter complained of. After such investigation, the commission shall enter 
such order relative thereto as may be necessary to render such employment or 
place of employment safe and not injurious to the welfare of the employees 
therein. For any Utah mine subject to the Federal Mine Safety and Health 
Act, the sole duty of the commission shall be to notify the appropriate federal 
agency of the complaint. Whenever the commission shall believe that any 
employment or place of employment is not safe or is injurious to the welfare of 
any employee, it may, of its own motion, summarily investigate the same, 
with or without notice, and issue such order as it may deem necessary to 
render such employment or place of employment safe. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other penalty provided in this title, if any em-
ployer, after receivmg notice, fails or refuses to obey the rules, regulations, or 
order of the commission relative to the protection of the life, health, safety, or 
welfare of any employee, the district court of Utah is empowered, upon peti-
tion of the commission to issue, ex parte and without bond, a temporary 
injunction restraining the further operation of the employer's business. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 16, subd. 8; tence in Subsection (1) and made a series of 
C.L. 1917, § 3076, subd. 8, L. 1921, ch. 67, minor punctuation and stylistic changes 
§ 1; fLS 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-17, L. 1945, ch. throughout the section. 
65, § 1; 1961, ch. 71, § 1, 1988. ch. 198, § 2. Federal Mine Safety and Health Act- — 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, re-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, designated the
 f e r r e d to m the next-to-last sentence in Subsec-
previousiy undesignated two paragraphs as
 tMa (1)f a p p e a r s as 40 U.S C §§ 801 to 962 
Subsections (1) and (2), inserted the third sen-
C-J.S. — 100 C J.S Workmen s Compensa- Key Numbers. — Workmen s Compensa-
tion § 384 tion *» 1090 
35-1-29. Depositions. 
The commission or any party may in any investigation cause depositions of 
witnesses residing within or without the state to be taken as in civil actions. 
History: L. 1917. ch. 100, § 21; CX. 1917, 
I 3081; ILS. 1933, 42-1-27; L. 1939, ch. 51, 
§ 1; C. 1943, 42-1-27. 
Extraterritorial powers. 
Commission has no power to hear evidence 
in another state where such procedure is ob-
C-J.S. — 100 CJJS. Workmen's Compensa-
tion § 384. 
Cross-References. — Depositions, Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rules 26 to 37. 
jected to. McGarry v Industrial Comma. 64 
Utah 592, 232 P 1090, 39 A.LJL 306 (1925). 
Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
~ 1092. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
35-1-65.1. Temporary partial disability — Amount of pay-
ments. 
(1) If the injury causes temporary partial disability for work, the employee 
shall receive weekly compensation equal to: 
(a) 662h% of the difference between the employee's average weekly 
wages before the accident and the weekly wages the employee is able to 
earn after the accident, but not more than 100% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of injury; plus 
(b) $5 for a dependent spouse and S5 for each dependent child under the 
age of 18 years, up to a marir""™ of four such dependent children, but 
only up to a total weekly compensation that does not exceed 100% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of injury. 
(2) The commission may make an award for temporary partial disability for 
work at any time prior to eight years after the date of the injury to an em-
ployee: 
(a) whose physical condition resulting from the injury is not finally 
healed and fixed eight years after the date of injury; and 
(b) who files an application for hearing under Section 35-1-99. 
(3) The duration of weekly payments may not exceed 312 weeks nor con-
tinue more than eight years after the date of the injury. Payments shall 
terminate when the disability ends or the injured employee dies. 
History? C. 1953, 35-1-65.1, enacted by L. 
1981, ch~ 287, § 2; 1988, ch. 116, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1988, designated the 
previously undesignated first two paragraphs 
as Subsections (1) and (2); in Subsection (1), 
divided the formerly undivided language into 
an introductory paragraph and Paragraphs (a) 
and (b), rewriting the contents thereof; in Sub-
section (2), divided the formerly undivided lan-
guage into an introductory paragraph and 
Paragraphs (a) and (b), substituted "hearing 
under § 35-1-99" for "such purpose prior to the 
expiration of such eight-year period" in Para-
graph (b) and, in Paragraph (a), substituted 
"the injury" for "such injury" and made a 
minor punctuation change; deleted the former 
last undesignated paragraph, which read "In 
no case shall the weekly payments continue 
after the disability ends or the death of the 
injured employee"; and added Subsection (3). 
35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or medical con-
sultants — Discretionary authority of commis-
sion to refer case — Findings and reports — Ob-
jections to report — Hearing — Expenses. 
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or 
for death, arising out of or m the course of employment, and if the em-
ployer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may refer 
the medical asoects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the com-
mission. The panel shall have the qualifications generally applicable to 
the medical panel under Section 35-2-56 
(b) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evalua-
tion of the medical aspects of a controverted case, the commission m its 
sole discretion may employ a medical director or medical consultants on a 
full-time or part-time basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical 
evidence and advising the commission with respect to its ultimate fact-
finding responsibility. If all parties agree to the use of a medical director 
or medical consultants, they shall be allowed to function m the same 
manner and under the same procedures as required of a medical panel. 
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make such study, take such X-rays, and perform such tests, including 
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the commission, as it may 
determine to be necessary or desirable. 
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make a report in writing to the commission m a form prescribed by the 
commission, and also make such additional findings as the commission 
may require. 
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute full coDies of the report to 
the applicant, the employer, and its insurance earner by registered mail 
with return receipt requested. Within 15 days after the report is deposited 
m the United States post ofiice, the applicant, the employer, or its insur-
ance carrier may file with the commission written objections to the re-
port. If no written objections are filed within that period, the report is 
considered admitted m evidence. 
(d) The commission may base its finding and decision on the report of 
the panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by 
the report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a 
contrary finding. 
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the case 
for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved. At the hearing, 
any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman 
of the medical panel, the medical director, or the medical consultants 
present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good 
cause snown, the commission may order other members of the panel, with 
or without the chairman or the medical director or medical consultants, to 
be present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. 
(f) The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical consul-
tants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be consid-
ered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained by the testi-
mony admitted. 
(g) The expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical 
director, or medical consultants and the expenses of their appearance 
before the commission shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 52, S 1; C. 1943, senes of minor stylistic changes; added "The 
Supp., 42-1-71.10; L. 1955, ch. 57, § 1; 1969, medical panel, medical director, or medical 
ch. 86, § 9; 1979, ch. 138, i 6; 1982, ch. 41, consultants shall" at the beginning of Subsec-
§ 1; 1988, ch. 116, 5 7. tion (2Kb), in Subsection (2X0, deleted "of the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- panel" following "report" in the first sentence, 
ment, effective July 1, 1988, designated the maerted "written" in the last two sentences 
previously undesignated first sentence as Sub- and made a senes of minor stylistic changes 
section (l)(a), the previously undesignated sec- throughout the subsection, in Subsection (2)(d), 
ond sentence as Subsections (2)(a) and (2Kb), inserted "medical director, or medical consul-
the previously undesignated third and fourth tants", deleted "by the commission" at the end 
sentences and the beginning of the previously and made a senes of minor stylistic changes, in 
undesignated fifth sentence as Subsection Subsection (2Xe), divided the former first sen-
(2)(c), the end of the previously undesignated tence into the present first two sentences, ln-
fifth sentence as Subsection (2)(d), the previ- serted "the medical director, or the medical 
ously undesignated sixth and seventh sen- consultants" in the second sentence and "or the 
tencea as Subsection (2)(ej, the previously un- medical director or medical consultants" in the 
designated eighth sentence as Subsection (2)(f) third sentence and made a senes of minor sty-
and the previously undesignated ninth sen- hstic changes throughout the subsection, in 
tence as Subsection (2Xg) The amendment Subsection (2X0 inserted "medical director, or 
also, in Subsection (1), added Paragraph (b) medical consultants" and "at the hearing" and 
and, in Paragraph (a), divided the formerly un- made a senes of minor stylistic changes, and 
divided language into two sentences and made rewrote Subsection (2)(g), which read The ex-
a senes of minor stylistic changes, in Subsec- penses of such study and report by the medical 
turn (2Xa), inserted "medical director, or medi- panel and of their appearance before the corn-
eal consultants" substituted "to be necessary mission shall be paid out of the fund provided 
or desirable" for "and thereafter" and made a by § 35-1-68." 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Duty of commission on remand of case. 
Effect of 1982 amendment. 
Function of medical panel. 
Mandatory referral to paneL 
Objections to report. 
Panel report as evidence. 
Qualifications of panel members. 
Referral to panel. 
—Discretion. 
Report, statements and admissions. 
Supplemental award. 
Cited. 
Duty of commission on remand of case. 
Where an order of the commission was va-
cated and the cause remanded because of a de-
ficiency in the evidence to support the report of 
a medical panel appointed by the commission, 
the commission was not required to make an 
award based solely on the plaintiffs evidence; 
but it was the responsibility of the commission 
to make some disposition of plaintiffs applica-
tion for an award and it was the prerogative of 
the commission to make a determination upon 
rights; rather, it governs the process under 
which claims are disposed of by the commis-
sion. Moore v American Coal Co., 737 P.2d 989 
(Utah 1987). 
Function of medical paneL 
It is the function of the medical panel to give 
the commission the benefit of its diagnosis re-
lating to those matters within its expertise, 
and not to infringe upon commission s respon-
sibility to decide the issues in a workmen s 
compensation case. IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 
584 ?J2d 828 (Utah 1978). 
Mandatory referral to paneL 
This section is mandatory in its requirement 
that a medical panel shall be convened upon 
the filing of a claim for compensation for injury 
bv acaaent, or for death, arising out of or in 
the course of employment when the employer 
or insurance carrier denies liability Lipman v 
Industrial Comma. 592 P.2d 616 (Utah 1979). 
The provision requiring the submission of 
the medical aspects of the case, including those 
involving causation, to a medical panel is man-
datory Schmidt v Industrial Comm'n, 617 
PM 693 (Utah 1980). 
Objections to report. 
Where plaintiff filed written objections to 
the report of a medical panel wmch had been 
appointed by the commission and objected to 
the report at the hearings, the burden was on 
the commission or the employer to sustain the 
report by oral testimony and. where this was 
not done, the report could not be considered as 
evidence. Hackford v Industrial Comm'n, 11 
Utah 2d 312, 358 P.2d 899 (1961) 
Where industrial commission had granted 
medical expenses from time of claimant's in-
jury to June 13, 1962, and workmen's compen-
sation to and including February 12, 1962, it 
did not act arbitrarily in denying payments for 
any later periods, the evidence at the hearing 
on objections to report of medical panel show-
ing that hospitalization on January 18, 1962, 
was made necessary by accident in course of 
claimant's employment causing temporary loss 
of control of claimant's diabetes; total tempo-
rary disability ceased on claimant's return to 
work initially following accident; there was no 
permanent disability; and further medical 
treatment was not needed as the result of the 
accident. Sanderson v. Industrial Comm'n, 16 
Utah 2d 348, 400 P^d 756 (1965). 
Panel report a* evidence. 
In denying workmen's compensation benefits 
to claimant. Industrial Commission did not err 
in considering report of medical panel ap-
pointed by commission along with other evi-
dence; medical panel and report did not en-
croach upon authority vested in commission to 
make findings of fact and conclusions. Jensen 
the evidence in the light of the decision of the 
Supreme Court or to order and hold a supple-
mental hearing to allow the parties to present 
additional evidence. Hackford v. Industrial 
Commn, 12 Utah 2d 250, 364 P.2d 1091 
(1961). 
Effect of 1982 amendment 
The 1982 amendment of this section, malpng 
the granting of a hearing discretionary, does 
not enlarge or destroy vested or contractual 
v United States Fuel Co., 18 Utah 2d 414, 424 
P.2d 440 (1967). 
In determining that order of commission 
denying award was supported by sufficient evi-
dence, question whether panel report submit-
ted to commission should be considered as evi-
dence was of no importance where one of panel 
members appeared and testified beiore com-
mission, and that testimony alone was suffi-
cient to sustain order of commission. 
McWilliams v Industrial Coram n, 21 Utah 2d 
266, 444 PJ2d 513 (1968) 
Although great respect must be paid to panel 
of medical experts appointed pursuant to this 
section, they are not ultimate finders of fact 
but rather reporters or medical aspects of given 
case in aid of Industrial Commissions ap-
praisal and weighing of all facts; therefore, 
where commission aaopted panel's conclusion 
which was unsupported bv any credible or com-
petent evidence, commission s award of bene-
fits was reversed. Redman Warehousing Corp. 
v Industrial Commn, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 
P2d 283 (1969) 
Where expert opinion of medical panel that 
was adopted by the commission was based on 
incorrect factual foundation assuming no prior 
history of bacx pathology, there was insuffi-
cient evidence to sustain the aware; and when 
new evidence of pnor history was obtained, 
matter was remanded to commission so that 
medical panel could reconsider its findings 
based on the new information. Utah Packers, 
Inc. v Industrial Comm n, 24 Utah 2d 230, 469 
P.2d 500 (1970) 
Although all other evidence and testimony 
indicated that the plaintiff was totally dis-
abled, report of the meoical panel that plaintiff 
had suffered a 50% permanent partial disabil-
ity is sufficient to support finding of industrial 
commission of a partial disability Shipley v C 
& W Contracting Co„ 528 P^d 153 (Utah 
1974). 
It is the duty of the commission to consider 
not only the medical panel report, but also all 
of the other evidence, and to draw whatever 
inferences and deductions than can be fairly 
and reasonabiya derived therefrom in reaching 
a decision on the issues. IGA Food Fair v. Mar-
tin, 584 PJ2d 828 (Utah 1978) 
Although medical panel report did not link 
employee s heart attack with the stress he had 
experienced four days earlier at his job, the 
commiasion's finding that there was a causal 
connection between the stress and the subse-
quent heart attack was neither arbitrary or ca-
pricious and not without any substantial evi-
dence to support it where a cardiologist testi-
fied that there was in fact A causal link be-
tween the stress and the heart attack. Pitts-
burgh Testing Lab. v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367 
(Utah 1983). 
Qualification* of panel members. 
Statutory requirement that medical panel 
member specialize in "treatment of the dis-
ease" was met where practice consisted of 
representing businesses and teaching, even 
though physician did not actually treat pa-
tients on an appointment basis. Edwards v. 
TOlery, 671 P.2d 195 (Utah 1983). 
Referral to paneL 
—Discretion. 
As the evidence of the causal connection be-
tween an employee lifting a very heavy beam 
and the perforation of his ulcer was not uncer-
tain or highly technical, the failure to refer the 
case to a medical panel was not an abuse of 
discretion, Champion Home Bldrs. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 703 P.2d 306 (Utah 1985). 
Report, statements and admissions. 
In a proceeding for supplemental award of 
workmen's compensation for deterioration of 
condition caused by original injury where the 
commission had appointed a medical panel to 
make an independent investigation and report 
for the guidance of the commission, neither 
party was bound by any statement or admis-
sion made either m the report or in the testi-
C.J.S. — 100 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensa-
tion § 590. 
A.L.R. — Workmen s compensation: u«e of 
medical books or treatises as independent evi-
dence, 17 A-L^.3d 993. 
mony of the chairman of the panel a doctor, in 
support of the report. Mollerup Van Lines v. 
Adams, 16 Utah 2d 235, 398 P.2d 882 (1965). 
In proceeding by widow of deceased oil 
dnller to recover compensation for his death 
from coronary occlusion on ground that death 
was caused by inhalation of fumes while mix-
ing mud compound designed to flush out 
clogged pipes during oil drilling operations, the 
industrial commission did not have to accept 
the most probable of three theories advanced 
as possibilities by the panel. Williams v. Indus-
trial Comma, 17 Utah 2d 169, 406 P.2d 707 
(1965). 
Supplemental award. 
Supplemental award of workmen s compen-
sation for deterioration of condition caused by 
original injury was properly granted by the 
commission where evidence of the medical 
panel, appointed by the commission, showed 
that claimant's subsequent injuries had not ad-
vanced deterioration of condition resulting 
from original injury Mollerup Van Lines v 
Adams, 16 Utah 2d 235, 398 P 2d 882 (1965). 
Cited in Hone v J J Shea Co., 728 P2d 
1008 (Utah 1986); Greyhound Lines v. Wal-
lace, 728 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1986). 
Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
«» 1694 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
35-1-85.1. Depositions of witnesses authorized. 
The commission or any party to a proceeding under this act may cause 
depositions of witnesses to be taken as in civil actions. 
History: C. 1953, 35-1*35, enacted by L. Meaning of "this act". — See same catch-
1965, en. 67, § 1. line in notes following § 35-1-46. 
35-1-91. Physical examinations. 
Any employee claiming the right to receive compensation under this title 
may be required by the commission, or its medical examiner, to submit him-
self for medical examination at any time, and from time to time, at a place 
reasonably convenient for such employee, and such as may be provided by the 
rules of the commission. If such employee refuses to submit to any such exam-
ination, or obstructs the same, his right to have his claim for compensation 
considered, if his claim is pending before the commission, or to receive any 
payments for compensation theretofore granted, shall be suspended during 
the period of such refusal or obstruction. 
History: I* 1917, ch. 100, § 91; O L . 1917, 
§ 3152; L. 1921, cfa. 67, § 1; ILS. 1933 & C. 
1943, 42-1-85. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Additional compensation. 
Duty of employee to submit to operation. 
Duty to submit to treatment. 
Refusal of medical treatment. 
Additional compensation. 
Order of Industrial Commission denying ad-
ditional compensation on ground workman had 
not become totally and permanently disabled 
since original finding and award for temporary 
disability would be affirmed although medical 
testimony was in conflict since mere failure to 
recover within six-year period after an acci-
dent is not conclusive that injury is permanent 
and total. Spencer v. Industrial Comma, 97 
Utah 140, 91 ?2A 439 (1939), 
Duty of employee to submit to operation. 
When a disability can be prevented or re-
moved by a minor and safe operation, or by 
safe medical treatment, then it is injured em-
ployee's duty to submit thereto, and refusal to 
do so will defeat his claim for compensation for 
disability caused thereby. The commission may 
consider ail the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the refusal in determining whether 
applicant acted reasonably or unreasonably in 
refusing to submit to treatment, American 
Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Industrial Comma, 76 
Utah 503, 290 P. 770 (1930). 
Duty to submit to treatment. 
The injured employee must submit to proper 
treatment, either medical or surgical, when it 
mvolves so serious risk or suffering and wnen 
it is such as a man of ordinary manly character 
would undergo for his own good. American 
Smelting & fe£. Co. v. Industrial Comma, 76 
Utah 503. 290 P. 770 (1930). 
Refusal of medical treatment. 
If an injured employee unreasonably refuses 
to submit to prooer medical treatment and as a 
result thereof his disability or injury is ren-
dered greater or permitted to continue, then 
such disability or injury as is caused by such 
unreasonable refusal is attributable to volun-
tary act of employee and not to the accident. In 
determining what constitutes a reasonable or 
an unreasonable refusal to submit to medical 
treatment, the facts and circumstances of the 
particular case must be inquired into. Ameri-
can Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
76 Utah 503, 290 P. 770 (1930). 
Refusal of employee to submit to necessary 
and proper medical treatment for his injury be-
cause he is timid and probably oversensitive to 
pain, constitutes no excuse for his refusal. 
American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 76 Utah 503, 290 P. 770 (1930). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
GJ.S. — 100 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensa-
tion § 484. 
Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
e» 1314. 
35-1-92. Autopsy in death cases — Authority of commis-
sion — Certified pathologist — Public record — 
Attending physicians — Penalty for refusal to 
permit — Liability. 
On the filing of a claim for compensation for death within the provisions of 
this act where, in the opinion of the commission it is necessary to accurately 
and scientifically ascertain the cause of death, an autopsy may be ordered by a 
majority of the commission and shall be made by a person designated by the 
commission,, The commission shall determine who shall pay the charge of the 
certified pathologist making the autopsy. Any person interested may desig-
nate a duly licensed physician to attend such autopsy, and the findings of the 
certified pathologist performing the autopsy shall be filed with the commis-
sion and shall be a public record. All proceedings for compensation shall be 
suspended upon refusal of a claimant or claimants to permit such autODsy 
when so ordered. Where an autopsy has been performed pursuant to an order 
of a majority of the commission no cause of action shall lie against any person, 
firm or corporation for participating in or requesting such autopsy. 
History: C. 1943, 42-1-85.10, added by L. Meaning of "thia act". — See same catch-
1949, chc 52, § 2; L. 1975, ch. 64, § 4. line in notes following § 35-1-46. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C<J.Sc —• 100 CJ.So Workmen'! Compenaa- Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
tion § 485. •» 1315. 
35-1-94. Employer's records subject to examination — 
Penalty. 
All books, records, and payrolls of an employer showing, or reflecting in any 
way upon, the amount of his wage expenditure shall always be open for in-
spection by the commission, or any of its auditors, inspectors, or assistants, for 
the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of the wage expenditure, the num-
ber of individuals employed, and such other information as may be necessary 
for the uses and purposes of the commission in its administration of the law. If 
an employer refuses to submit any books, records, or payrolls for inspection, 
after being presented with written authority from the commission, he is liable 
for a penalty of $100 for each offense. This penalty shall be collected by a avil 
action and paid into the Injury Fund administered by the Workers' Compensa-
tion Fund. 
History: L. 1917, cfa. 100, § 92; CJL 1917, tences, rewriting the contents thereof, and 
§ 3153; ILS. 1933 & C. 1943,42-1-87; L. 1977, made a series of minor stylistic changes 
ch. 151, § 8; 1988, ch. 56, § L throughout the first sentence. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- Cross-References. — Injury Fund, § 35-3-
ment, effective July i, 1988, divided the former 2. 
second sentence into the present last two sen-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 100 C J.S. Workmen's Compensa- Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
tion § 384 •» 1090. 
35-1-98. Control of physicians. 
All physicians and surgeons attending injured employees shall comply with 
all of the rules and regulations, including the schedule of fees for their ser-
vices, adopted by the commission? and shall make reports to the commission at 
any and all times as required by it as to the condition or treatment of any 
injured employee, or as to any other matters concerning cases in which they 
are employed A copy of the first report shall be mailed to the injured em-
ployee. Any physician or surgeon who refuses or neglects to make any report 
required by this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a 
fine of not more than $500 for such offense. 
History; L> 1917, ch> 100, § 95; OL. 1917, 42-1-91; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-91; 
§ 3156; L» 1919, ch. 63, § 1; ILS. 1933, L. 1967, ch- 66, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Admissibility of testimony. 
Form of report. 
Admissibility of testimony. cant was suffering from, such testimony was 
Where company doctor's testimony was admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule, 
based upon report by X-ray specialist to com- Uta-Carbon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
pany doctor as to what, in his opinion, appli- 104 Utah 567, 140 P.2d 649 (1943). 
Form of report. which he describes the injury. Utah Delaware 
The attending physician makes his report on Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Utah 187, 
a printed blank furnished for that purpose in 289 P. 94 (1930). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
CJ-S< — 99 C J.S. Workmen's Compensa- Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
tion § 266. ~ 979. 
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An Introduction to Organic Brain 
Syndromes 
Richard L. Elliott, M.D., Ph.D. 
Organic brain syndromes are of forensic interest for several reasons. 
First, patients with organic brain syndromes may require judicial determina-
tion of competence in any of a number of areas, e.g., testamentary capacity, 
need for financial guardianship, or competence to make medical decisions. 
Second, any patient whose mental state is of legal interest will need evalua-
tion for contributing organic factors; uncovering these factors may have con-
siderable medical and legal consequence. Third, the discovery of organic fac-
tors may be decisive in the outcome of a judicial proceeding, where "hard" 
biological data are often accorded more weight, and are thus more per-
suasive, than "soft" psychological data. This article provides an introductory 
overview of the organic brain syndromes. For each syndrome, the clinical 
features are described and are illustrated with a case vignette, the more com-
mon etiologies are presented, and selected aspects to the evaluation are high-
lighted. In addition, since the detection of malingered mental illness is a key 
component in many forensic contexts, characteristics are described which 
help to distinguish actual from malingered mental illness. 
INTRODUCTION 
Examples in which patients with organic brain syndromes impinge upon the 
legal system are numerous. Civil issues of testamentary capacity, need for 
guardianship, and competence to accept or refuse medical treatment arise not 
infrequently with these patients. In the area of criminal law, evaluations for 
criminal responsibility and fitness to stand trial very often need to consider the 
possibility of an organic brain syndrome. Personal injury cases involving pos-
sible injury to the brain represent still another arena in which evaluation for 
the presence of an organic brain syndrome is important. 
Richard L. Elliott, M.D., Ph.D., formerly fellow in Law and Psychiatry, Section on 
Psychiatry and the Law, Rush-Prcsbyterlan-St. Luke's Medical Center, is affiliated with the 
Department of Psychiatry and Health Behavior, Medical College of Georgia. Address cor-
respondence and reprint requests to: Richard Elliott, MD., Ph.. D., Department of Psychiatry and 
Health Behavior, Medical College of Georgia, Augusta, GA 30912-7300. 
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This review is written in order to provide an introduction to organic brain 
syndromes. Each of the organic brain syndromes recognized in the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual, third edition (DSM-III)(American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, 1980), is discussed with respect to diagnosis, clinical features, and 
etiologies. Emphasis is placed on those parts of the evaluation that are most 
pertinent to a forensic setting. Case vignettes illustrate common examples of 
the ways in which organic brain syndromes may present forensically. 
Before considering the individual organic brain syndromes, a few general 
remarks may be helpful. First, the words "organic" and "brain" convey the 
idea that these mental disorders are thought to be caused by physical (organic) 
processes affecting the brain. This distinguishes them from the so called "func-
tional" disorders such as schizophrenia and the affective (mood) disorders, in 
which a psychological explanation is thought to provide a better basis for the 
cause of the illness. Although this distinction between organic and functional 
disorders is time honored, a broader, biopsychosocial view of each illness 
which considers biological, psychological, and social factors is necessary for a 
complete understanding. For the organic brain syndromes, this means that the 
psychological and social aspects of the illness must not be neglected. For ex-
ample, a patient with dementia, an organic brain syndrome, may have a 
profound psychological reaction to the illness and become depressed in addi-
tion to demented. 
A second preliminary comment concerns the distinction between organic 
brain syndromes and organic mental disorders. An organic brain syndrome is a 
collection of psychiatric signs and symptoms whose etiology is thought to be 
organic, but is not specified. Thus dementia is an organic brain syndrome. An 
organic mental disorder is an organic brain syndrome whose etiology is known 
or presumed. The organic brain syndrome dementia, which is thought to be 
due to progressive degenerative dementia (Alzheimer's Disease), is an organic 
mental disorder. 
There are many possible organic etiologies for each organic brain syndrome. 
Virtually any medication or physical illness can conceivably lead to an organic 
brain syndrome. A listing of all the possibilities for any organic brain 
syndrome would be so large as virtually to constitute a table of contents in a 
textbook of medicine. Therefore, only the more common etiologies will be in-
cluded in the following discussion. 
Since many of the same etiologies can lead to different organic brain 
syndromes, e.g. J head trauma can cause an organic personality syndrome, 
dementia, or an amnestic syndrome, parts of the evaluation, including history 
taking, physical examination, and laboratory testing will be common to the 
various syndromes. In order to forego listing these for each separate evalua-
tion, this basic evaluation for organic brain syndromes is listed in Table I (see, 
for example, Wells, 1985). Under the individual organic brain syndromes, 
only the special features of the particular evaluation will be noted. 
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TABLE I Evaluation of Organic Brain Syndromes 
History: illnesses, medications, alcoholism, head trauma 
Examination: physical, neurologic and mental status examinations 
Laboratory: CT scan or Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the head, chest x-ray, complete blood 
count, chemistry survey, urinalysis, toxicologic screening, vitamin B12 and folic 
acid levels, serology for syphilis 
Neuropsychological testing is an important part of the evaluation for most 
organic brain syndromes. It consists of a battery of tests administered by a 
qualified neuropsychologist, preferably one with forensic experience. The tests 
help to localize lesions within the brain, ascertain the extent of organic 
deficits, and determine character trails which are important to the psychologi-
cal understanding of the individual. Furthermore, and some times more impor-
tantly, some of the neuropsychological tests help to determine when an in-
dividual is feigning, exaggerating, or denying psychological symptoms. 
Wasyliw and Golden (1985) have provided a review of forensic neuro-
psychological testing. 
DEMENTIA 
Dementia is the most common of the organic brain syndromes, affecting 
five percent of adults over age 65 severely and another 10% to a moderate de-
gree (Blazer, 1983). Synonyms for dementia include chronic organic brain 
syndrome and, because of its association with increasing age, "senility." The 
hallmark of dementia is global deterioration in intellectual ability affecting 
more than one area of performance. Deterioration is an important component 
to the definition of dementia, as it distinguishes dementia from syndromes in 
which impaired intellectual ability is present from birth. In addition, the im-
pairment must be severe enough to cause difficulties in social or occupational 
functioning. The presence of findings on a mental status examination, in the 
absence of social or occupation dysfunction, is not sufficient to make a diag-
nosis of dementia. 
The current diagnostic criteria according to DSM-III are shown in Table II. 
Memory impairment is a hallmark of dementia and usually consists of dif-
ficulties with either short-term (minutes) or recent (days or weeks) memory. 
Remote (many years) memory is often relatively preserved. Short-term 
memory is tested by asking the patient to remember the names of several unre-
lated objects. After a period of several minutes, the patient is asked to recall 
the objects. Most people can recall two or three objects after several minutes. 
Alternatively, the patient can be told a short story, which, after several 
minutes, he is asked to retell. Recent memory is tested by asking the patient 
about events which have taken place hours or days prior to the examination. 
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A. A loss of intellectual abilities of sufficient severity to interfere with social or occupa-
tional functioning. 
B. Memory impairment 
C. At least one of the following: 
(1) impairment of abstract thinking, as manifested by concrete interpretation of 
proverbs, inability to find similarities and differences between related words, 
difficulty in defining words and concepts, and other similar tasks. 
(2) impaired judgment 
(3) other disturbances of higher cortical function, such as aphasia (disorder of lan-
guage due to brain dysfunction), apraxia (inability to carry out motor activities 
despite intact comprehension and motor function), agnosia (failure to recognize 
or identify objects despite intact sensory function), "constructional difficulty" 
(e.g., inability to copy three-dimensional figures, assemble blocks or arrange 
sticks in specific designs) 
(4) personality change, i.e., alteration or accentuation of premorbid trails 
D. State of consciousness not clouded (i.e., does not meet the criteria for delirium or in-
toxication, although these may be superimposed). 
E. Either (1) or (2): 
(1) evidence from the history, physical examination, or laboratory tests, of a 
specific organic factor that is judged to be etiologically related to the distur-
bance 
(2) in the absence of such evidence, an organic factor necessary for the develop-
ment of the syndrome can be presumed if conditions other than organic mental 
disorders have been reasonably excluded and if the behavioral change repre-
sents cognitive impairment in a variety of areas. 
This should be information which can be verified, such as meals, visitors, 
medicaJ tests, or current events. More precise testing of memory functioning is 
done with the aid of neuropsychological testing. 
The capacity to think in an abstract manner is tested by asking the patient to 
interpret proverbs, taking into account the patients' previous intellectual and 
educational background. A patient who interprets the proverb "what docs <still 
waters run deep> mean?" as "nothing changed, they arc still waters," is 
responding in a concrete and not abstract manner. Other disorders in which 
concrete thinking is evident include schizophrenia and mental retardation. 
Judgment is the capacity for solving personal and social problems. Someone 
who makes inappropriate sexual comments to a stranger, or makes a will leav-
ing die estate to a stranger, is generally thought to be showing impaired judg-
ment. Since most legal difficulties arise from a patients' impaired judgment, it 
is important to evaluate the patients' capacity in this area. This is generally 
done by determining the patients' actual responses to events in his life. Ex-
amples of impaired judgment include dressing inappropriately and wandering 
about carrying large sums of money. Occasionally a hypothetical situation 
might be presented to a patient such as asking him to slate what he would do 
if he discovered a fire in a crowded movie theater. 
Personality changes art common in dementia, with paranoia being the most 
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common. Because of their forgetfulness, patients may forget where they put a 
particular object. After having lost a number of objects, a patient might begin 
to believe that someone has been stealing them. It is easier for some patients 
to accept the idea that objects are being stolen, rather than to acknowledge 
their failing memory. Other delusions may arise as the patient attempts to ex-
plain the disorder and confusion he or she is experiencing. 
Other disturbances in functioning are common in dementia. The patient may 
have an apraxia, that it, a difficulty carrying out motor tasks despite intact 
muscle strength and coordination. An example of a patient with an apraxia is a 
women I saw who was accusing her landlord of stealing her keys and replac-
ing them with others that did not fit. When I asked her to demonstrate die 
"wrong key" she attempted to put the key in the door upside down, and even 
after multiple attempts, was unable to recognize that simply reversing the key 
would have worked. Another common disturbance in dementia is aphasia, a 
difficulty with written and spoken language. Patients may have difficulties 
finding words for common objects and become considerably frustrated when 
they are unable to express themselves. 
The course of dementia varies greatly with the etiology. The onset may be 
insidiously slow as in Progressive degenerative dementia (Alzheimer's Dis-
ease), or sudden, following head trauma or severe sustained lack of oxygen to 
the brain. Once established, the dementia may be relatively stable, such as that 
following anoxia, slowly progressive over a number of years as in 
Alzheimer's Disease, or rapidly progressive over several months to several 
years as in a dementia due to an infectious etiology such as Jacob-Creutzfeld's 
disease. 
Dementia has many possible causes, but by far the most common, account-
ing for about 50% of all dementias, is Progressive degenerative dementia 
(Alzheimer's Disease). Its onset is typically in the seventh or eighth decade 
but occasionally appears in younger or older individuals. As noted above, it 
usually begins gradually, with mild memory loss or subtle personality changes 
frequently marking die onset of the disease. The early memory changes are 
often minimized by die patient, who may explain them as "anyone can forget 
once in a while," or "my memory has never been very good." The personality 
changes may be as subtle as an increase in irritability or depression. Anomer 
early sign of Alzheimer's Disease is an increase in difficulty adjusting to new 
situations. An employee who has performed well for a number of years may 
have increasing difficulty solving commonplace problems, and may be unable 
to adapt to changes at home or work. This can be enormously frustrating and 
may lead to potentially violent outbursts in a normally docile person. 
Changes in personal care are often noted in the early stages of dementia. 
Personal cleanliness and grooming may suffer, offensive habits may appear, 
and there may be a deterioration of housekeeping. 
The later stages of Alzheimer's Disease are maiked by further deterioration 
in memory, personality, self-care, and judgment. In die final stages, the patient 
may be bedridden, lose control of bladder and bowel and speak unintelligibly. 
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The etiology of Alzheimer's Disease is unknown. There is an increased risk 
of Alzheimer's Disease in the children of an affected parent, but genetic fac-
tors play a role in a minority of patients. Attempts to identify an environmen-
tal or infectious agent have been intriguing though inconclusive (Mozar, 1987). 
Other common causes of dementia include multiinfarct dementia (due to 
multiple small strokes), normal pressure hydrocephalus, dementia secondary to 
chronic alcoholism, vitamin deficiency, hypothyroidism or hyperthyroidism, 
.tertiary syphilis, head trauma, brain tumor, or other intracranial masses. Some 
medications have produced a clinical picture of dementia e.g., anticholinergics, 
analgesics, antihypertensives, cimetidine, lithium, disulfiram, and digitalis. 
These and other causes of dementia are discussed more comprehensively else-
where (Wells, 1977). 
A final "cause" of dementia is depression, which leads to a pseudo-de-
mented state which may mimic that of dementia. Depression can lead to dif-
ficulties with memory and concentration, changes in personality, and deteriora-
tion in personal care. However, these changes in depression are due to a lack 
of interest or effort, rather than a lack of ability. Improving the patient's effort 
either with pharmacotherapy or psychotherapy, results in a lifting of the 
depression and the disappearance of "dementia" (Wells, 1979). 
Evaluation of a suspected dementia consists primarily of the items listed in 
Table I. The focus of the evaluation is the search for potentially treatable 
causes of dementia; approximately 15% of dementias arc completely or partial-
ly reversible (Popkin & MacKenzie, 1985). Historical information of par-
ticular importance includes a history of head trauma, use of medications, 
thyroid disease, or syphilis. A complete physical and neurological evaluation 
is necessary. Laboratory tests should include all of those listed in Table I, with 
particular emphasis on a brain scan, either via computed tomography or mag-
netic resonance imaging, thyroid function tests, a urine drug screen, and a test 
for syphilis. Tests not included in Table I which might be pursued include 
screening for heavy metals, an electroencephalogram (EEG) and a lumbar 
puncture. 
Case One 
The points contested in this case were four codicils to the will of an old 
gentleman, on the grounds that at the lime of taking them he was in-
capable by reason of mental decay of understanding their nature and ef-
fect. It was testified...that during the two or three years within which the 
codicils were made he frequently did not know people with whom he had 
previously been well acquainted, without being told who they were; that 
he would go about the house and garden looking around and appearing 
not to know what he was about. On one occasion he not only did not 
recognize a certain person but could not be made to understand who he 
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deceased asked him how old was the witness's father (though he had 
been dead 16 years and had been his partner in business), and soon after 
he inquired of the witness after his health as if he were addressing 
another person. Several similar lapses in memory and various appearan-
ces of childishness in his conduct were also revealed by the evidence 
amply sufficient no doubt to induce superficial observers to believe that 
he was mentally incapacitated from disposing of property. It appeared, 
however, that he was in the habit of giving in favor of his brother's but-
ler, drafts accurately signed and filled up; that at Christmas lime he gave 
the servants Chrisunas boxes and the usual amount of money, and entered 
die sums in his account book; that he received a farmer's bills for corn 
and paid them with drafts on his banker which he wrote himself, going 
through the whole business correctly and dial he docketed the bills and 
receipts on the back with the name of the person to whom paid, and die 
amount of the bill making corresponding entries also in his private ac-
count book; that he signed 20 drafts at least one morning for payment of 
his brother's debts without instruction or assistance, subscribing his own 
name as executor of his brother, that we would detect errors in the cast-
ing up of other people's account; that he discharged his physician's bills 
correctly; and in short dial he managed his affairs and that prudently and 
correctly, to the last. It was also testified diat it was his practice to read 
aloud to the family the psalms and lessons of the day; dial he was fond of 
a litUe fun and played at whist remarkably well. That a person might have 
done all of this and yet been unsound in mind, is certainly not impossible; 
but it was far beyond die power of mind so broken up by old age and die 
invasion of disease as to being capable of altering testamentary deposition 
previously made. This consideration and the fact that die circumstances of 
the case furnish abundant reasons for the alteration, induced court to 
decide in favor of the capacity of die testator. 
This case, taken from Isaac Ray's seminal Treatise on the Medical 
Jurisprudence of Insanity (Ray, 1902) illustrates a common forensic problem 
in which dementia is a consideration, testamentary capacity. This case further 
illustrates that while the subject may have had some impairment in his 
memory, orientation, and "childishness in his conduct," there was abundant 
evidence that he had not lost the capacity to make sound financial decisions. 
Thus, a finding of the presence of dementia in this patient was not sufficient 
to demonstrate lack of testamentary capacity. Some areas of intellectual perfor-
mance, especially in the early stages of dementia, are relatively spared. 
Whereas dementia ultimately involves generalized deterioration in multiple 
areas of functioning Uiere are other organic brain syndromes which involve 
changes in relatively circumscribed aspects. These syndromes comprise the 
next section of the article, and include organic personality syndrome, amnestic 
syndrome, organic hallucinosis, and organic delusional syndrome. In some 
VOL. 5, NO. 3 • 1987 
iviagnosijc untena for Organic Personalily Syndrome 
A. A marked change in behavior or personality involving at least one of die following: 
1) emotional lability, e.g., explosive temper outbursts, sudden crying; 2) impairment 
in impulse control, e.g., poor social judgment, sexual indiscretions, shop lifting; 3) 
marked apathy and indifference, e.g., no interest in usual hobbies; 4) suspiciousness 
or paranoid ideation. 
B. No clouding of consciousness as in delirium; no significant loss of intellectual 
abilities, as in dementia; no predominant disturbance of mood, as in organic affec-
tive syndrome; no predominant delusions or hallucinations as in organic delusional 
syndrome or organic hallucinosis. 
C. Evidence from the history, physical examination, or laboratory test of a specific or-
ganic factor that is judged to be etiologically related to the disturbance. 
O. This diagnosis is not given to a child or adolescent, if the clinical picture is limited 
to the features that characterize attention deficit disorder. 
cases, these syndromes are relatively stable over time; in others they represent 
early stages of dementia, and progressively worsen. 
ORGANIC PERSONALITY SYNDROME 
The essential feature of this syndrome is a change in personality due to or-
ganic factors, but not due to another organic brain syndrome such as dementia 
The DSM-III diagnostic criteria are shown in Table III. 
Case Two 
Phineas Gage was a strong, healthy and popular foreman of a railroad ex-
cavation crew. While working at a she, an explosion drove an iron bar 
into the left side of his face, existing through the top of the skull. He 
quickly regained consciousness and was treated by a physician. Remark-
ably enough, there was no residual impairment except for dramatic per-
sonality changes. He was described by his physician as "fitful, irreverent, 
indulging at times in the grossest profanity (which was not previously his 
custom), manifesting but little deference to his fellows, impatient of 
restraint or advice when it conflicts with his desires, at time pertinatiously 
obstinate yet capricious and vacillating, devising many plans for future 
operation which no sooner are arranged than they are abandoned in turn 
for others appearing more feasible. His mind was radically changed so 
that his friends and acquaintances said he was no longer Gage." (Harlow, 
1868). 
The type of personality changes seen in this disorder are primarily related to 
the location of damage to the brain. For example, damage to the frontal lobes 
may result in "pseudopsychopathic" personality changes. A hard working, law 
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TABLE IV Diagnostic Criteria for Intermittent Explosive Disorder 
A. Several discrete episodes of loss of control of aggressive impulses resulting in 
serious assault or destruction of property. 
H. Behavior that is grossly out of proportion to any precipitating psychosocial stressor. 
C. Absence of signs and generalized impulsivity or aggressiveness between episodes. 
D. Not due to schizophrenia, antisocial personality disorder or conduct disorder. 
abiding citizen such as Phineas Gage might become belligerent, impulsive, 
sexually indiscreet, and may come to the attention of auworities as the result 
of antisocial behavior. Damage to another part of the frontal lobes may lead to 
an apathetic, indifferent depressed appearance. In some patients with damage 
to the temporal lobes, there is a tendency to humorless verbosity in speech and 
an increase in religiosity and aggressiveness. 
A change in the organic personality syndrome proposed for the revised edi-
tion of DSM-IH, to be published in 1987, is die inclusion of intermittent ex-
plosive disorder. The diagnostic criteria for intermittent explosive disorder are 
shown in Table IV. 
In DSM-III, intermittent explosive disorder is listed as a disorder of impulse 
control. This classification, however, does not take into account experimental 
data supporting die hypothesis that die disorder results from an irritable electri-
cal focus in the limbic system. The limbic system, which lies deep within die 
brain, is responsible for some of our most basic responses such as a fight or 
flight' response to danger, feeding, and sexuality. Stimulation of parts of die 
limbic system have been shown to produce rage attacks in susceptible in-
dividuals. In some patient widi intermittent explosive disorder, electrodes have 
been planted deep within the brain to record stimuli in the limbic system. In 
diese patients, an irritable focus was found which seemed to trigger the ex-
plosive episodes. Aside from the diagnostic criteria in Table IV, clinical in-
dicators suggesting an intermittent explosive disorder include a history of 
physical assaults, especially wife and child beatings; padiological intoxication; 
a history of impulsive sexual behavior, at times including sexual assaults; and 
a history of many traffic violations and automobile accidents. (Mark & Ervin, 
1970) 
This diagnosis is particularly appealing to defense attorneys. Its use has 
been advocated in insanity evaluations to explain impulsive violent behavior 
(Ratner, 1979). However, before making the diagnosis, the clinician should 
consider whether a particular violent act was part of a general pattern of impul-
sive antisocial behavior, or whether it truly represented a relatively isolated ex-
plosive episode in the life of a normally peaceful person. 
Some of the more common causes of organic personality syndrome include 
damage to the frontal or temporal lobes secondary to head trauma or tumor; 
temporal lobe epilepsy (complex partial or psychomotor seizures); metabolic 
derangements such as hypoglycemia, hypo- or hypercalcemia or hypo-
natremia; and Huntington's disease. 
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Jn addition to the evaluation outlined in Table I, for intermittent explosive 
disorder an electroencephalogram (EEC) is often useful, particularly wilh 
respect to the need for anticonvulsant treatment. Neuropsychological testing 
may help to document the presence of dysfunctional personality traits and is 
useful in ruling out the presence of other signs of organic brain disease. Per-
haps the most important part of the evaluation is collateral information from 
sources such as families, employers, teachers, and the military in order to 
document pre-existing personality traits. It is not the existence of pathological 
personality trails per se which indicate this organic brain syndrome; rather, it 
is a documented change in personality which is necessary to make the diag-
nosis. 
AMNESTIC SYNDROME 
For an accurate memory to be created, an event must be perceived accurate-
ly. An event is detected by sensory organs, registered as such in the cerebral 
cortex, preserved for at least several minutes as a short-term memory, and 
retained as a long-term memory. In addition, the presence of a memory can 
not be detected unless memory recall is intact. When these processes are dis-
rupted, the result is anterograde or retrograde amnesia. Anterograde amnesia is 
a deficit in the ability to learn new material. Its presence is tested for by 
giving the patient several words or a short paragraph to remember and asking 
him to recall it after several minutes. Retrograde amnesia, an inability to recall 
previously learned material, is tested by asking the patient to recall events 
from his life, and to recall previously learned historical events such as the 
names of presidents. Overlearned material, such as one's birth place, is rela-
tively resistant to amnesia and is not a sensitive test for the presence of amnes-
tic syndrome. 
Organic causes of amnesia usually indicate damage to structures lying 
within or near the limbic system, the major stiuctures being the hippocampus, 
fornix, medullary bodies, and parts of the thalamus. The most common causes 
of amnesia in a nonintoxicated individual is brain damage due to the effects of 
chronic alcoholism and thiamine deficiency, i.e., Korsakoff's syndrome. In 
this syndrome, there is a devastating effect on anterograde memory, with rela-
tive preservation of retrograde memory. Thus the patient is able to perceive 
and register information (he is alert and is able to repeat a series of digits), 
but, after several minutes, he is no longer able to remember it. Because of dif-
ficulties forming new memory, the patient becomes disoriented when placed in 
new surroundings, e.g., a jail or hospital. 
Diagnostic criteria for the Amnestic Syndrome are give in Table V. Al-
though not part of these criteria, an interesting clinical feature, particularly in 
the early stages, is the presence of confabulation. Confabulation is the creation 
of stories, sometimes fantastic, to fill in the gaps in the patient's memory. 1 
once asked a hospitalized patient with Korsakoff's syndrome what he had 
eaten for dinner the night before. He responded that he had gone to a "meeting 
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TABLE V Diagnostic Criteria for Amnestic Syndrome 
A. Both short-term memory impairment (inability to learn new information) and long-
term memory impairment (inability to remember information that was known in the 
past) are the predominant clinical features. 
B. No clouding of consciousness, as in delirium and intoxication, or general loss of 
major intellectual abilities, as in dementia. 
C. Evidence from the history, physical examination, or laboratory tests of a specific or-
ganic factor that is judged to be etiotogically related to the disturbance. 
of the Polish Falcon Club for a pig fry." It is important to realize that the 
patient is unaware that what he is saying is false. This distinguishes confabula-
tion from lying, which is done intentionally in order to deceive. 
In addition to the effects of chronic alcoholism and thiamine deficiency, 
other causes of amnestic syndrome include head trauma, herpes simplex en-
cephalitis, transient global amnesia, other vitamin deficiencies, and amnesia 
following surgery or electroconvulsive therapy (Benson & Blumer, 1982). Am-
nestic syndrome due to head trauma is often forensically important, and is 
predominandy anterograde amnesia, so that memory is lost for events which 
occurred following the injury. In addition there may be a mild retrograde am-
nesia for events occurring prior to the injury which tends to improve with time. 
The most common manner in which amnesia becomes a forensic issue is 
during an evaluation for criminal responsibility or fitness to stand trial. In 
these contexts, the examiner must decide whether the amnesia, usually 
retrograde for the events in question, is the result of organic causes, is pys-
chogenic, or is the result of malingering. Amnesia due to organic causes is dif-
ferentiated from psychogenic amnesia and malingering by the factors shown in 
Table VI. Outside of a forensic setting, secondary gain is most prominent in 
feigned (malingered) amnesia, is often present in psychogenic amnesia, but is 
relatively uncommon in organic amnesia. However, in a forensic setting, 
secondary gain may be prominent in all three conditions. During a sodium 
Amytal interview, during which the barbiturate sodium amobarbital is ad-
ministered intravenously, the patient wiUi organic amnesia will often ex-
perience a worsening of his amnesia. The memory of a patient with 
psychogenic amnesia is often improved during an Amytal interview. Patients 
with feigned amnesia maynot reveal their true intention during a sodium Amy-
tal interview. In organic amnesia, there is loss of information relating to per-
sonal as well as nonpersonal events. In psychogenic amnesia lost memories 
are of events of a personal nature. Persons feigning amnesia will often claim 
to have forgotten all events, personal and nonpersonal. New learning is often 
impaired in organic amnesia, particularly in illnesses such as thiamine deficien-
cy and chronic alcoholism. New learning is usually not impaired in amnesia 
due to head trauma or transient global amnesia. In psychogenic amnesia and 
feigned amnesia, new learning is usually unimpaired. Confabulation may be 
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Etiology 
Secondary Gain 
Recovery 
Response to 
sodium Amyul 
Persona] versus 
nonpcrsonal 
memory loss 
New Learning 
Confabulation 
Organic Amnesia 
Organic 
Uncommon 
Spotty 
Worsening 
Both 
Often impaired 
In early stages 
Psychogenic 
Emotional 
Often 
Full 
Amnesia 
Often improved 
Personal 
Unimpaired 
Uncommon 
Feigned Amnesia 
Simulated 
Always 
Full 
May or may not 
improve 
Both 
Unimpaired 
Uncommon 
present in early stages of organic amnesia, but is usually not present in either 
psychogenic or feigned amnesia. 
The most important aspects of the evaluation of the amnesic patient are 
shown in Table I. Of these, neuropsychological testing is often the most use-
ful, as it can document the presence of both kinds of amnesia anterograde and 
retrograde, and maybe helpful in delecting the malingering patienL Further-
more, neuropsychological testing may help to document the presence of more 
widespread intellectual deficits, since it is not uncommon for the demented 
patient to present first with symptoms of amnesia. 
ORGANIC HALLUCINOSIS 
Hallucinations refer to the perception of a sensation in the absence of an ex-
ternal stimulus. Hallucinations may occur in any of the five senses: auditory, 
visual, tactile, olfactory, or gustatory. Most commonly, hallucinations occur in 
the presence of a functional psychiatric disorder such a schizophrenia or an af-
fective disorder, They may also occur in the presence of a global organic brain 
syndrome such as delirium (see below) or dementia. Occasionally, hallucina-
tions occur in the absence of a functional or another organic disorder, in which 
case the diagnosis of organic hallucinosis is made (Table VII.) 
TABLE VII Diagnostic Criteria for Organic Hallucinosis 
A. Persistent or recurrent hallucinations are the predominant clinical feature. 
B. No clouding of consciousness as in delirium; no significant loss of intellectual 
abilities as in dementia; no predominant disturbance of mood as in organic affective 
syndrome; no predominant delusions as in organic delusional syndrome. 
C. Evidence from the history, physical examination, or laboratory tests of a specific or-
ganic factor that is judged to be etiologically related to the disturbance. 
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Any kind of hallucination may be the result of organic hallucinosis, but 
auditory hallucinations are more likely to be functional than organic, and 
visual, gustatory, olfactory, and tactile hallucinations are more likely to be or-
ganic than functional. From a forensic perspective, the most important deter-
mination is whether the hallucinations are malingered. Some of the characteris-
tics which distinguish true from malingered hallucinations are summarized in 
Table VIII. Malingered hallucinations tend to be more detailed, bizarre, fantas-
tic, and complex. Malingered hallucinations are more likely to be sudden in 
onset; functional hallucinations tend to appear gradually, often at first in an in-
distinct form and only becoming more distinct after a period of time. 
Malingered hallucinations tend to be continuous, that is, subjects will report 
that the hallucinations do not get better under any circumstances. Functional 
hallucinations often wax and wane throughout the day and patients often 
report that they can do certain things either to cause the hallucinations to disap-
pear or to make them less bothersome. Malingered hallucinations are often un-
accompanied by the appropriate emotions such as fear or bewilderment, and 
are often unaccompanied by associated delusions. Functional hallucinations 
can be quite frightening to the patient and are often accompanied by delusions 
such as ideas of persecution. A patient malingering hallucinations is usually 
quite willing to discuss them and may even offer them for discussion spon-
taneously: "doc, did I tell you I was hearing voices?" Patients with functional 
hallucinations usually do not mention them at all until they are asked specifi-
cally and even then may be reluctant to discuss them. The presence of an an-
tisocial personality disorder, a previous history of malingering, and obvious 
secondary gain should alert the examiner to the presence of malingered hal-
lucinations. Furthermore, the absence of symptoms usually associated with a 
chronic mental disorder should raise the examiner's index of suspicion that the 
hallucinations are malingered. These symptoms include flat affect, thought dis-
order, difficulties concentrating, inertia, and poor interpersonal relations. 
The most common cause of organic hallucinosis is substance abuse, par-
TABLE VIII Differentiating True from Malingered Hallucinations 
True Malingered 
Complexity Voices conversing, simple Fantastic, bizarre, complex 
images involving multiple senses 
Onset Gradual, evolving from Sudden onset of fully formed 
indistinct, vague to fully hallucinations 
fonned 
Stability Wax and wane; patient has Continuous, nothing makes 
control over their them better 
intrusiveness 
Accompanying Affect Fear, anxiety, bewilderment Lack of appropriate affect 
Delusions Common Less common 
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ticularly by hallucinogens such as LSD and phencyclidine. In alcohol hal-
lucinosis, the hallucinations usually consists of voices or unformed sounds 
such as buzzing or hissing. Their onset is within the first 48 hours after cessa-
tion of drinking, and are accompanied by other signs of alcohol withdrawal, 
such as sweating, insomnia, tremulousness and increased pulse and blood pres-
sure. They usually occur in an individual who has abused alcohol for many 
years. Their duration is typically less than a week, but approximately 10% of 
patients develop chronic hallucinosis. Other common causes of organic hal-
lucinosis include temporal lobe epilepsy and sensory deprivation. 
ORGANIC AFFECTIVE DISORDER 
Case Three 
A 60-year-old male attorney with no previous history of psychiatric disor-
der was referred by his employer to determine his fitness to return to 
work. He had no history of criminal behavior and was performing ade-
quately in his job until six days prior to the evaluation. At that time, a 
complaint was filed against him for making sexual comments about a 
female co-worker. Over several days, he became irritable, shouted angrily 
at his clients, and appeared to have difficulty concentrating on his work. 
His thinking was described as disorganized. On the day of die evaluation 
he had gotten into an altercation with co-workers and was brought to the 
emergency room for evaluation. 
On arrival he was unshaven and disheveled, despite wearing an expensive 
suit. He protested furiously at being evaluated. His speech was rapid, dif-
ficult to interrupt, and changed quickly from one topic to another. He 
paced throughout the interview. He denied hallucinations but admitted to 
ideas of reference and persecution, saying his employer was jealous of his 
knowledge and experience and wanted to discredit him. A call to his fami-
ly physician revealed that he had begun taking the steroid medication 
Prednisone two weeks prior, to treat an exacerbation of an intestinal disor-
der. The physician was concerned that the patient might be taking it exces-
sively; the patient had told him that he had "never felt better" shortly 
after starting the Prednisone. 
The family physician convinced the patient to enter the hospital where, 
after tapering the Prednisone and initiating low dose antipsychotic treat-
ment, the patient returned to his baseline state: genial, considerate, and 
without any sign of mania or* depression. 
This is an example of an organic affective syndrome, caused by a prescrip-
tion medication Prednisone. The diagnostic criteria for this syndrome are 
shown in Table IX. 
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TABLE IX Diagnostic Criteria for Organic Affective Syndrome 
A. 'Ihe predominant disturbance is a disturbance in mood, with at least two of the as-
sociated symptoms listed in criterion B for manic or major depressive episode. 
B. No clouding of consciousness as in delirium; no significant loss of intellectual 
abilities as in dementia; no predominant delusions or hallucinations, as in organic 
delusional syndrome or organic hallucinosis. 
C. Evidence from the history, physical examination, or laboratory tests of a specific or-
ganic factor that is judged to be etiologically related to the disturbance. 
The primary disturbance in an organic affective disorder is a change in 
mood. In the manic form, the mood becomes euphoric, expansive, or irritable. 
Associated symptoms may include an increase in activity or restlessness, in-
creased talkativeness, flight of ideas, generosity, a decreased need for sleep, 
distractibility, and involvement in potentially harmful activities such as sexual 
indiscretion, buying sprees, and reckless driving. In the depressed form of the 
organic affective syndrome, there is either a depressed mood or a pervasive 
loss of pleasure in almost all aspects of living. Associated symptoms may in-
clude a change in appetite or sleep patterns, an increase or decrease in physi-
cal activity, a loss of interest in activities or sexual drive, fatigue, feelings of 
worthlessness or guilt, an inability to concentrate, and suicidal thoughts. In 
both the manic and depressed forms, psychotic symptoms such as hallucina-
tions or delusions may be present 
Organic affective syndrome is most commonly due to a side effect of a 
medication, such as steroids (Prednisone), antihypertensives (propranolol, 
methyldopa, reserpine), disulfiram (Antabuse), levo-dopa, cimetidine 
(Tagamet), and tricyclic antidepressants (Medical Letter, 1986). Endocrine dis-
orders, especially disorders of the thyroid, parathyroid, and adrenal glands are 
commonly associated with changes in mood. Strokes to the left frontal lobe of 
the brain, pancreatic tumors, withdrawal from a stimulant such as am-
phetamine or cocaine, head trauma and infectious processes as tertiary 
syphilis, influenza, and mononucleosis are other causes of organic affective 
syndrome (Krauthammer & Klerman, 1978). 
While anyone presenting with a mood disorder deserves a careful examina-
tion to rule out organic causes, an even higher index of suspicion is warranted 
for the older patient who has no previous history of affective disorder. Parts of 
the evaluation deserving particular attention are a careful review of all medica-
tions, including those purchased over-the-counter, a urine drug screen, and 
tests of endocrine functioning including thyroid and adrenal function tests. 
ORGANIC DELUSIONAL SYNDROME 
Delusions are fixed, false beliefs that are not part of one's culture. Examples 
of delusions include ideas of reference and persecution (that one is the object 
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„j uio rui, mat one is being poisoned by family members), 
delusions of grandiosity (that one is especially gifted, talented, or possesses 
special powers) and delusions of control (that one's thoughts, feelings, and ac-
tions are being controlled by others). They may be found in functional disor-
ders such as schizophrenia and affective disorders, and in other organic disor-
ders such as dementia or delirium. In some cases, delusions may be an iso-
lated feature of an organic brain syndrome (Table X). 
TABLE X Diagnoitic Criteria for Organic Delusional Syndrome 
A. Delusions arc the predominant clinical feature. 
B. There is no clouding of consciousness as in delirium; there is no significant loss of 
intellectual abilities as in dementia; there are no prominent hallucinations as in or-
ganic hallucinosis. 
C. There is evidence from the history, physical examination or laboratory tests of a 
specific organic factor that ii judged to be etiologically related to the disturbance. 
Case Four 
In 1800, 43 years before McNaughton, James Hadfield fired a pistol at 
King George III as the king entered his royal box at the theater. Hadfield 
had been well until 1794 when he was wounded during the French 
Revolutionary wars, receiving two sword blows to the head penetrating 
the skull to the brain. On recovery, he developed the belief that he was 
King George, and would stand staring into a mirror, looking for his 
crown. Later he believed himself to be God or Christ, and thought that 
only his martyrdom could save the world from disaster. Because suicide 
was a sin, he conceived a plan where he would shoot at, but miss the 
king, in the h(>pe that he would be executed. 
During his trial, his attorney, Thomas Erskine, argued for the acceptance 
of partial insanity, as manifested by Hadfield's delusions, as exculpatory. 
After a dozen witnesses testified to Hadfield's unfortunate history, the 
Chief Justice stopped the proceeding and the jury was advised to enter a 
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity (Maeder, 1985). 
The most common type of organic delusional syndrome is a paranoid state 
marked by suspiciousness, tenseness, hypervigilance, pathological jealousy 
and/or ideas of reference, and persecution. Substance use, particularly of am-
phetamines, cocaine, or hallucinogens is a common etiology and is often ac-
companied by an underlying personality disorder having paranoid traits. 
Chronic alcoholism, Vitamin B12 deficiency, temporal lobe epilepsy, hyper-
parathyroidism and temporal lobe epilepsy have all been associated with or-
ganic delusional disorder. 
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DELIRIUM 
The final organic brain syndrome to be considered is delirium, a complica-
tion of many medical disorders, affecting 10%-40% of hospitalized patients. 
Delirium is distinguished from the syndromes already discussed by the 
presence of "clouding of consciousness," a term which signifies a state in 
which one's appreciation of the environment is altered, and in which one's at-
tention span is diminished. The altered awareness of the environment may be 
manifested by drowsiness, by hyperalertness in which minor stimuli (such as 
the sound of air coming through air ducts) are not screened out, or by misper-
ceptions (hearing a door bang shut and believing it to be a gunshot). A 
diminished attention span is manifested by an inability to maintain a string of 
thoughts and an inability to sustain mental concentration, such as that required 
to memorize and repeat a list of numbers. Associated symptoms include hal-
lucinations, delusions, disorientation, altered sleep pattern, and incoherent 
speech (Table XI for diagnostic criteria for delirium). The onset of delirium 
may be abrupt, over several hours or several days, and its course tends to wax 
and wane. Psychotic symptoms may be so vivid as to severely impair the 
patient's judgment—delirious patients have been known to jump out of hospi-
tal windows, pull out catheters and intravenous lines, and become combative 
towards staff and family. 
TABLE XI. Diagnostic Criteria for Delirium 
A. Clouding of consciousness (reduced clarity of awareness of the environment) with 
reduced capacity to shift, focus, and sustain attention to environmental stimuli. 
B. At least two of the following: (1) perceptual disturbance, misinterpretations, il-
lusions, or hallucinations; (2) speech that is at times incoherent; 3) disturbance of 
sleep—wakefulness cycle with insomnia or daytime drowsiness; 4) increased or 
decreased psychomotor activity. 
C. Disorientation and memory impairment (if testable). 
D Clinical features that develop over a short period of time (usually hours to days) and 
lend to fluctuate over the course of a day. 
E. Evidence from history, physical examination or laboratory tests of a specific organic 
factor that is judged to be etiologically related to the disturbance. 
Delirious patients are not usually seen in the outpatient setting, because they 
are usually so ill physically as to require hospitalization. The most common 
reasons for forensic evaluations in these patients involve determination of com-
petence to consent to or refuse treatment and competence to sign out of the 
hospital against medical advice. However, even in these cases, forensic con-
sultation is often not obtained, as either the patient's condition is so serious as 
to require the medical staff to begin treatment immediately or because the 
delirium goes unrecognized. 
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Case Five 
A 54-year-old man, hospitalized with a complaint of stomach pain be-
came irritable with the nursing staff on the night following his admission. 
He complained that medications weren't being delivered promptly and 
that "since nothing is being done for me, I might as well as go home." He 
demanded to leave the hospital and the medical resident on call was 
notified. After examining him briefly, the medical resident allowed the 
patient to sign out of the hospital against medical advice. 
Within several hours, the hospital was notified that police had found the 
patient lying at die bottom of a dry swimming pool located nearby. He 
had apparendy fallen into the pool accidentally. He was returned to the 
hospital where it was learned he had fractured a leg and an arm in the 
fall. On examination by the psychiatric consultant, he was found to be 
agitated, easily distractible, spoke in a rambling manner, and had hyperac-
tive tendon reflexes elevated blood pressure and pulse, and was tremulous 
and sweating. A telephone conversation with his wife revealed that he 
had been a heavy drinker for many years, and had been "out of his mind" 
several times previously when he had slopped drinking suddenly. A diag-
nosis of alcohol withdrawal delirium was made alter other causes of 
delirium were ruled ouL 
This case illustrates how easily delirium may be overlooked, especially in 
the absence of prominent delusions or hallucinations. However, because 
thought processes are so disorganized during delirium, patients may not be 
able to exercise proper judgment wim respect to many areas of their life in-
cluding medical treatment 
In evaluating the delirious patient the emphasis is on a search for offending 
substances, either prescribed medication, illicit drugs, or substances such as al-
cohol which are associated with delirium. The list of the medications reported 
to cause delirium is very large; some of the more frequent ones include 
steroids, analgesics (especially opiates), antiarrythmics (e.g., lidocaine), 
cimetidine, levo-dopa, and antidepressants (Medical Letter, 1986). Many drugs 
taken without adverse consequences by millions of people, may produce a 
toxic delirious reaction in a patient predisposed by age or by previous injury 
to the brain (as in chronic alcoholism). Similarly, a minor infection or metabo-
lic derangement may produce delirium in a predisposed patient. Because die 
presence of delirium often heralds a potentially serious medical illness or com-
plication, every effort must be made to determine the etiology. In addition, 
most cases of delirium can be quickly reversed once recognized. If there is a 
question as to whether delirium exists, an electroencephalogram may be help-
ful; almost all delirium is associated with an abnormal EEG (Lipowski, 1980). 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES A THE LAW 
I^UPII^ L,UOAVJM 
Organic brain syndromes are important in forensic behavioral sciences for 
several reasons. First, patients with organic brain syndromes often come to die 
attention of the legal system. There may be questions about competence, such 
as to make a will, to consent to or to refuse medical treatment, to manage 
financial affairs, or to stand trial. There may be a question about criminal 
responsibility; was a particular criminal behavior related to the presence of 
delusions, hallucinations or mood changes, any of which may have had an or-
ganic etiology? Second, from a treatment perspective, an organic brain 
syndrome signals the presence of an underlying physical illness. Often these 
illnesses are highly treatable; in these cases the psychiatric prognosis is very 
good, much better dian if the syndrome had been treated as a functional disor-
der. Finally, and especially important in the forensic setting, patients may 
malinger mental illness, the most common example being malingered amnesia. 
Familiarity with me clinical characteristics of the particular organic brain 
syndrome makes it much more likely that the malingering will be detected. 
When should a patient be evaluated for an organic brain syndrome? Al-
though it is not practical to give all patients the most extensive organic evalua-
tion, every patient should receive at least minimal screening: a medical his-
tory, physical examination, basic blood work, and, in die forensic setting, a 
urine drug screen. The most complete organic evaluation should be reserved 
for special cases. For example, a patient over 40 years of age who presents 
with antisocial behavior of recent onset should be evaluated more thoroughly, 
from an organic perspective, than a 22-year-old man with longstanding 
psychopadiic traits. Odicr patients for whom there is an increased index of 
suspicion for an organic brain syndrome include elderly patients, patients with 
a long history of drug and/or alcohol abuse, and patients with a history of 
trauma to the head. 
Even in the absence of predisposing factors, tiierc are circumstances in 
which a vigorous evaluation may be pursued in an attempt to uncover biologi-
cal data. "Hard" data such as a CT scan or an electroencephalographic tracing, 
which show "something wrong'* with the brain, may be more persuasive in a 
courtroom than "soft" psychological explanations. Especially in high profile 
cases where expense is relatively less important, organic data are vigorously 
searched for, even in die absence of clinical findings which would suggest an 
organic brain syndrome. Thus, a scan of the brain done on would-be presiden-
tial assassin John Hinckley, showing enlarged ventricles, may have helped to 
persuade the jury diat he indeed did have "something wrong" with his brain. 
They found him not guilty by reason of insanity. 
Finally, organic brain syndromes are important in helping us to understand 
the relationship between mind and brain. Studies which show an association 
between specific lesions in the brain and corresponding defects in aspects of 
mental functioning, e.g., speech or memory, are invaluable in furdiering our 
knowledge in the neuroscienccs. Rather dian finding, as Eckstein (1970) said, 
VOL. 5, NO. 3 • 1987 
tnat "no modern surgeon enters the skull to find mind/' perhaps it is more the 
case that no modern psychiatrist enters the mind without finding brain. 
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BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE LAW 
Menstruation and Crime: A Critical 
Review of the Literature from the 
Clinical Criminology Perspective 
Bruce Harry, M.D 
Charlotte M Balcer, M.D. 
The authors review the literature on the relationship between menstrua-
tion and crime, focusing upon the methodological limitations of these 
studies in the broader context of criminological and menstruation research. 
Based on this review, they conclude: the present state of scientific 
knowledge is such that it is unknown whether there is an association be-
tween any phases of the menstrual cycle and crime; there is no evidence 
linking fluctuations in reproductive hormones to criminal behavior; and, 
this lack of scientific knowledge is so glaring that evidence regarding 
menstruation and crime should not be admissible in criminal trials. 
INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between menstruation and crime has been a focus of 
scholarly interest for at least a century In his review of women and crime, Pol-
lak (1950) cited several late nineteenth and early twentieth century European 
observations that reported an ostensibly positive association between ihc 
menstrual flow and a variety of antisocial/cnrmnal behavior such as resistance 
against public officials, shoplifting, thefts, arson, and homicide (Icard, 1890, 
Aubry, 1891; Lombroso and Ferrero, 1894; Krafft-Ebing, 1902; Gross, 1905, 
Gudden, 1907; Marx, 1908; Boas, 1909, von Hentig, 1930). 
Among early English language writers, both Healy (1915) and Burt (1925) 
thought menstruation amplified underlying emotional instabilities, with the 
premenstrual phase perhaps being the time of greatest instability. However, 
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coal mine and after —• 
Q So there was an injury while you were 
employed at Peabody? 
A January the 16th, 1975. 
Q Okay. 
A At 4:10 p.m. 
Q Okay. And what type of back injury did you 
sustain at that point? 
THE COURT: We needn't go through all of that. 
That's already been litigated, counsel. 
THE WITNESS: Fracture of T-10, I was told. 
MR. TREASE: Okay. 
Q (By MR. TREASE) Okay. And did you receive 
an impairment rating at that point? 
A I don't know. 
THE COURT: That's all in the file. 
MR. TREASE: Okay. 
Q As far as that injury, you left their 
employment. Who was it that you were next employed by? 
Were you employed by another coal mining operation? 
A Yes. 
Q Was that coal mining operation under the 
name of Hiawatha? 
A Yes. U.S. Fuel Company Hiawatha. 
Q Okay. During what time period were you 
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Q Okay. And it shifted or it fell out? 
A Tipped over, due to air slack, you know. 
That was about four foot thick, seven to eight feet 
high and sixty feet long. 
MR. BOORMAN: Can he date that injury? 
Q (By MR. TREASE) What was the date of that 
injury? 
THE COURT: What, Mr. Boorman? 
MR. BOORMAN: I was just wondering when the 
date — when that injury was. 
THE COURT: Was that the December injury? 
Q (By MR. TREASE) Did that occur in December 
of 1981? 
THE COURT: It should have been '79. 
THE WITNESS: No, it was — 
MR. DYER: October 24th according to the 
Findings of Fact of the prior litigation. 
THE COURT: The October '79 injury? And then 
there was a December '79 injury too. 
MR. DYER: Well, and an August '79 injury too. 
There are three of them listed. 
THE COURT: Right. Can't we just consult the 
file on those, counsel? 
MR. TREASE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Those were all previously 
28 
MR. BOORMAN: Your Honor, if that doesn't show 
up in the medical records, then he is not qualified to 
answer it. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. TREASE: Okay. 
THE COURT: The records speak for themselves, 
counsel. 
MR. TREASE: Okay. 
Q So do you believe now that you did actually 
fall on the Northwest yard? 
A I don't know. 
Q You do not have a belief one way or the 
other? 
A I have a mental picture in my mind that I 
did, but I can't say, under oath, that I did fall in 
the Northwest yard. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
scenario, 
A 
Q 
A 
Do you believe you fell? 
It's very possible. 
Okay. 
I have a mental picture in my mind. 
Following that fall or that flashback 
you weighed the truck. Is that correct? 
Yes. 
And from that point, you left — 
I went over to the Roadrunner Truck Stop to 
39 
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A He suggested that I go on to Blythe and go 
the hospital there, which was approximately twenty-six 
miles away. 
Q Did you heed his advice and go to Blythe? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you seek medical attention at Blythe? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you recall who it was that attended you 
at Blythe? 
A The name I don't remember. He was a negro 
fellow. He was an intern or a student out of --
Q Medically educated though? 
A Huh? 
Q Was he medically educated? 
A Yes. He was the doctor in charge of 
emergency room at the Blythe Hospital. 
Q Okay. The records reflect — 
A I was in the emergency room all day long. 
Q The records reflect that you, at that point, 
underwent x-rays of some type. Is that correct? 
A He took an x-ray of my back, yes. 
Q What did that x-ray portray? 
MR. BOORMAN: I think they'll speak for 
themselves. 
THE COURT: That's true. You needn't answer 
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A The doctor told me that 
of the head has caused a tremendous 
of the — 
Q 
MR. BOORMAN: Your Honor, 
(By MR. TREASE) Which d 
MR. BOORMAN: — whatever 
for themselves. 
Q 
A 
Q 
truck? 
A 
February 
1987. 
Q 
THE WITNESS: Dr. 
(By MR. TREASE) 
And Dr. Kotrady 
Okay. When was 
Bushnell 
Okay. 
Both. 
the last 
February the 17th, — No 
— Yeah, February the 17th 
And why was it that you 
the blow to the back 
chemical imbalance 
I think 
octor is 
reports i 
• 
— 
that? 
will speak 
time that you drove 
Yeah, 
, when I 
had not < 
I think 
got home, 
iriven the 
truck since that time? 
A I can't — I can't saf :ely 
a truck down the road and maintain p 
and judgment and — 
Q 
somebody 
A 
Q 
Is that 
else told 
Highway 
your personal 
you? 
patrolman. 
Okay. Was there anybc 
profession that has told you not 
drive a 
roper 
opinion, 
>dy 
to 
vehicle — 
lane control 
or 
from the 
drive 
has 
medical 
truck? 
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